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Pilot in Loop Assessment of Fault Tolerant Flight Control Schemes in a Motion 
Flight Simulator 
 
Girish Kumar Sagoo 
 
This research presents the pilot in the loop tests carried out in a Six-Degree of Freedom (6-DOF) 
motion flight simulator to evaluate failure detection, isolation and identification (FDII) schemes 
for an advanced F-15 aircraft. The objective behind this study is to leverage the capability of the 
flight simulator at West Virginia University (WVU) to carry out a performance assessment of 
neurally augmented control algorithms developed on a Matlab/Simulink® platform. The 
experimental setup features an interface setup of Gen-2 Simulink® ® schemes with MOTUS 
Flight Simulator (MFS). The set up is a close substitute to a real flight and thus is helpful in 
evaluation of the schemes in a realistic manner. The graphics in X-plane is used to obtain visual 
cues and the motion platform is used to obtain motion cues in the simulator cockpit. The whole 
set-up enables the pilot to respond with a joystick in the advent of a failure as he would otherwise 
in a real flight. The pilot response in maintaining the mission profile is different for different 
neural network augmentations and thus an indication of performance comparison of these 
schemes. Secondly, FDII schemes are developed for a sensor and actuator failure using an 
adaptive threshold for cross-correlation coefficients of the angular rates of the aircraft.     Failure 
detection, isolation and identification logic is formulated based on monitoring the cross-
correlation parameters with their Floating Limiter (FL) bounds. The FDII scheme developed 
shows a good performance with desktop simulation because of no pilot activity but with a pilot in 
the loop significant cross-correlation of the rates occur and hence the scheme become more 
susceptible to wrongs FDII. In addition, the pilot might induce some coupling of the cross-
correlation parameters between detection and identification time which may trigger false 
detections and may configure the controller differently based on incorrect detection. Thus it is 
necessary that FDII scheme accommodate real flight conditions. The performance of the FDII 
schemes is improved with a pilot in the loop by monitoring the cross-correlation parameters and 
fine tuning FDII algorithms for real situations. This study has set up an excellent example to 
effectively utilize the aural, visual and motion cues to create a higher level of simulation 
complexity in designing control algorithms. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Importance of Failure Detection and Identification 
The most published work on failure detection, isolation and identification (FDII) is in 
the aerospace domain. A control flight system that is able to recover an aircraft from a 
failure by reconfiguration is a challenge among many aerospace researchers. The fault 
tolerance has gained a considerable academic research interest after two commercial 
carrier accidents in late 1970s and it was realized that there is a persistent need to warn 
the pilot of any malfunctions arising in the aircraft. The Delta 1080 flight accident1 was 
because one of the elevators jammed at 19 deg and the pilot had no indication about its 
occurrence. Another accident of the AA DC10 aircraft2 could have been avoided if the 
pilot had known about the failure. The pilot had 15 sec to react after he realized about the 
failure and subsequently the plan crashed. Therefore, a prompt display of failure 
information to the pilot started gaining significant importance among the aerospace 
researchers. Failures to the aircraft primary control surfaces are critical and can lead to 
the loss of the aircraft. Smart failure detection and identification schemes can 
immediately detect failures and can reconfigure the controller and help in situations 
where pilot becomes perplexed in the advent of failures. A similar accident due to 
actuator failure was the 30 December 2001 crash of Air Vehicle 5 due to rudder actuator, 
which became loose while conducting a mission. Operators redirected the UAV to return 
to base, though during the return the rudder began flapping excessively, causing a 
catastrophic failure. Similar incidents of Boeing aircraft accidents due to actuator failure 
(rudder) are shown in Fig. 1-1. The sensor failures can also lead to fatal accidents and is 
evident by the recent accident of B-2 bomber aircraft on 23rd February, 2008. The 
accident was because of moisture in sensors which distorted three of the aircrafts twenty 
four sensor readings forcing the bomber to pitch up on takeoff which resulted in stalling 
and subsequent crash. The sensor readings confused the pilot and resulted in the loss of 










Fig. 1-1-Boeing Rudder Failure Accidents (Courtesy Seattle Times) 
 Typically, physical redundancy for the actuators of the primary control surfaces is not 
available. Therefore, actuators failures represent major threats to flight safety. Due to the 
unique dynamic signature of each and every failure, it might not be feasible to train pilots 
 3 
in an exhaustive manner to handle every class of actuator failures. The existence of an 
actuator failure detection isolation and identification scheme can significantly improve 
the pilot reaction time and, in turn, enhance the success probability for the post-failure 
recovery. Fault tolerant flight control systems may allow an aircraft to avoid 
unrecoverable flight conditions, regain equilibrium, and continue the mission. Many of 
these systems are based on the availability of an AFDII scheme to trigger compensating 
changes in the control laws. 
 
 
Fig. 1-2-A locked slat on a Boeing 737 -844 (courtesy www.airliners.net) 
1.2. Overview of Flight Simulation 
 A flight simulator is a system imitating or simulating the experience of flying an 
aircraft. It can range from PC based video game, instrument only simulator, fixed 
simulator to full size cockpit replica mounted on hydraulic or electromechanical 
actuators. A full flight simulator has motion platforms and is capable of replicating the 
physical sensations of flight. In spite of varying complexities and functions of a flight 
simulator, the fundamental attribute is similar for desktop running flight simulation 
software as well for a multi- million dollar full scale flight simulator. Both represent an 
input-output representation of the system process varying only in comprehensiveness and 
complexity of information. The principle task of a flight simulator is to model the 
 4 
dynamics of an aircraft which is achieved by way of a mathematical model of the system 
under consideration. The mathematical model generally needs to be executed in real time 
and mainly embedded in digital format through computers in the form of a software 
algorithm or program. 
 
The pilot interface subconsciously tricks the brain into reflexive actions giving 
appropriate stimulations. Thus the inputs must be adequately timed and accurate for any 
realistic flight simulation experience and stipulates a perfect blend of aural, visual and 
motion cues. The aural cues replicate all sounds audible in a cockpit and ranges from 
engine, propellers, warnings, radio chatter and even aerodynamic sounds because of 
retracting landing gear, thrust vectoring, surface deflections as well as weather related 
such as thunderstorms and downbursts. 
 
The main components of a simulator are visual cueing and motion cueing for pilot 
immersion during the simulator experience. The level of immersion measures closeness 
to flying the real aircraft. Recent advances in computers and graphics have vastly 
improved the visual cueing in flight simulators.  Figure 1-3 shows the sub logic flight 
simulator (1982) and the Microsoft flight simulator (2004) and the evolution of graphics 
and resolution for visual cues is evident. 
  
Figure 1-3 A comparison of visual cue improvement (1982 to 2004) 
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The motion cues in a flight simulator provide a real-time approximation of the 
translational and rotational accelerations experienced by the pilot. The exact replication 
of these acceleration are however not feasible in practice because of imposed mechanical 
constraints. The high fidelity flight simulators typically use a six-degree of freedom 
(DOF) motion simulation. The translational and rotational acceleration exerted by the 
airplane dynamics provides the motion cue necessary to make the pilot feel immersed in 
the simulator. This is achieved by the acceleration phase is followed by a washout phase 
beyond human threshold of perception. The washout phase is essential to maintain the 
working of simulator within a confined area. The simulator retrieves back to its original 
position during the washout phase without the perceivable sensory receptions of the pilot. 
 
A full flight simulator (FFS) duplicates almost all aspects of the aircraft and its 
environment including the six-degrees of freedom motion. In the academic research flight 
simulators are used extensively for understanding various aerospace subjects such as 
flight dynamics and man-machine interaction (MMI). The range of these simulators can 
be anything from video games to extremely expensive simulator designs such as 
LAMARS Figure 1-4 installed at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base at Ohio. 
 
Figure 1-4- LAMARS Motion Flight Simulator at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 
 
The simulators are characterized by Instructor operating stations (IOS) which allows an 
instructor to modify flight conditions within the flight simulator cockpit. Many flight 
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simulators have a provision to control the simulator from the cockpit, either from a 
console adjacent to the pilot or a co-pilot.  
 
With the advent of low cost electromechanical actuators the flight simulators have 
become an affordable engineering solution. In the past its applications were limited 
because of the multi-million dollar hydraulic devices used in flight simulators. Thus the 
flight simulators were limited to larger corporations and military centers. High end flight 
simulators today incorporate motion bases or platforms to provide cues for real motion. 
These complement the visual cues shown in Figure 1-5 and are vital to simulate a real 
flight.  
 
Figure 1-5-Visual Cues in a home-built Boeing Style Simulator  
Also the motion cues are advantageous in case of poor visibility conditions. The motion 
platforms used commonly in the flight simulators are six cylinders Stewart platform 
called as hexapods. The electromechanical actuators for MOTUS flight simulator are 




Figure 1-6 Six Electromechanical Actuators for MOTUS Flight Simulator at WVU 
1.3. Research Objectives 
There are many advantages of flight simulation among aerospace researchers because 
of the significant reduction in cost. Also, for researchers it is the only way to test new 
equipments, approaches while remaining in the research budget as well as providing 
safety and fewer hazards in operation. A flight simulator is capable of reproducing a 
variety of human behavior and is a tool to evaluate new concepts, approaches, formulate 
new means of training pilots in critical situations without using a real aircraft. 
 
This research is inspired from many advantages of using a flight simulator in the design 
process. The motion flight simulator is used to create a research test-bed for carrying out 
analysis of advanced flight control schemes. In this particular study it has been used to 
perform evaluation of FDII scheme and in principle used to demonstrate the design, 
implementation of this man-machine interface of Simulink scheme with the MOTUS 
flight simulator. The setup features a MOTUS Six-DOF flight simulator at   West 
Virginia University (WVU) which is used as a test bed to test different control schemes 
for an F-15 aircraft. Specific algorithms will be used to evaluate the performance of 
different NN schemes. Since the FDII schemes take care of the failures automatically, 
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monitoring the pilot activity is an important indication of the efficacy of the FDII 
schemes. The pilot activity can significantly qualify the performance of the FDII scheme. 
If the pilot issues negligible stick activity in the advent of a failure then it’s an indication 
of good failure detection and accommodation scheme. The tasks outlined to complete this 
effort are described in the following paragraph. 
 
Initially, an interface for communication of the F-15 Gen-2 Schemes with the 6-DOF 
MOTUS flight simulator at WVU is developed. The X-plane software provides visual 
and aural cues while the Motion Base Computer (MBC) provides motion cues by way of 
electromechanical motors in the motion base. This is accomplished by developing plugins 
for X-plane software that enables execution of Simulink® based codes in the MOTUS 
flight simulator. The communication of data is through User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 
facilitated by the X-plane software. 
 
In the next part of study, nominal conditions are tested in the flight simulator for               
3 different pilots in order to reproduce the earlier work on the Gen-2 NLDI schemes. 
These tests are baseline tests for the study and serve to test the interface. This will be 
followed by failure tests with no failure detection and identification schemes. 
 
Thereafter, a FDII scheme for an actuator/sensor is developed using adaptive threshold 
for cross-correlation coefficients of the angular rates. The scheme is capable of detecting 
failures and piloted experiments will be carried out for different failure conditions. The 
performance of EMRAN NN is compared with a No NN case considering the tracking 
error (TE), pilot activity etc for the FDII scheme. The technique for FDII warning system 
is utilized to warn pilot in advent of a failure by making a provision to receive text 







1.4. Overview of Thesis 
The organization of the thesis will be in the following manner: 
 
Chapter 2 will cover the literature review on the failure detection and identification. The 
earlier work done on Actuator failure Detection Identification and Accommodation 
(AFDIA) and Sensor/Actuator Failure Detection, Identification and Accommodation 
(S/AFDIA) using fixed threshold is reviewed. The extension of the fixed threshold to an 
adaptive threshold for actuator and sensor FDII is discussed.  
 
 
Chapter 3 will discuss the concept behind the F-15 Gen-2 Neurally Augmented Schemes, 
AFDIA/SFDIA schemes and the failure detection and identification concepts. The 
adaptive threshold approach for integrated FDII formulated for the research problem at 
hand is described in detail. 
 
Chapter 4 will explain the setup of the experimental environment.  This includes detailed 
descriptions the Motus flight simulator and the X-plane software. This will be followed 
by a detailed explanation of the interface and how the pilot is included in the loop and 
how the visual, aural, motion cues are obtained for F-15 Simulink schemes. The hardware 
and experimental setup will be explained in detail and the graphic user interface to carry 
out experiments will be explained. 
 
Chapter 5 will show the simulation results obtained for different failure scenarios for a no 
FDII and a FDII case in respect to TE performance, pilot compensation and detection 
efficiency. The results of adaptive threshold approach for integrated FDII scheme will be 
presented.  
 
Chapter 6 will contain the conclusion of the results that are obtained from the conducted 
experiments in the motion simulator. This will be followed by future recommendations 
on the work. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
2.1. General Description  
A fault can be defined as an unexpected change in a system which can range from a 
malfunction to a catastrophic failure. Normally a fault tends to degrade the system 
performance and, sometimes, makes it inoperable. The term “fault” and “failure” are here 
used interchangeably.  However, the term failure suggests complete breakdown while a 
fault is somewhat a malfunction rather than a catastrophe. Failure detection is very 
important in general as it can help us avoid major breakdown and is essential to maintain 
safety in critical systems such as chemical plants3,nuclear plants4, space systems5 etc. The 
FDII problem is widely investigated problem in flight control research because of 
increasing complexity and interconnectivity of system at end. In general FD implies some 
sort of continuous monitoring of the measurable outputs of the system. Under nominal 
conditions the variable tends to follow rather well established patterns. A failure in a 
flight control system (FCS) will induce deviations from nominal and predictable patterns. 
  
Hardware redundancy is a traditional way to achieve fault tolerance in dynamical 
systems and the term strictly means duplicating the channels with hardware components 
such as sensors, actuators or even computers. Based on the desired level of reliability, 
duplex, triplex or quadruple parallel systems are often implemented. In case of a failure 
backup switch switches the control to the redundant system. Clearly an important way of 
achieving fault tolerance is by means of multiple lanes of hardware. Some of the 
examples of redundant control surfaces in modern aircrafts include speed brakes, wing 
flaps, differential canards, spoilers, rudder below fuselage. Redundancy in thrust control 
mechanism involves differential thrusts, thrust vectoring and canted engines.  
Nonetheless this type of redundancy comes with a price of additional weight, cost, 
volume and maintainability. In small systems like UAVs and small scaled prototypes 
where weight is a critical component of design hardware redundancy is not a feasible 
alternative. Recent advances in the control theory and advanced mathematical modeling 
facilitates development of a whole new FDII methods based on functional rather than 
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physical redundancy. The implementations of onboard digital computers have led to 
development of fault detection schemes relying on analytical rather than hardware 
redundancy. The analytical redundancy provision in the aircraft rather than hardware is 
also promising approach as it is cost effective, weight reducing and less power dependent 
whilst providing a substantial increase in performance and reliability. It should be noted 
that in aerospace systems there has been a little tendency to replace hardware redundancy 
due to the safety requirements. Therefore it acts somewhat to suppress some levels of 
replication in the system for example- replacing a quadruplex system with a triplex 
employing using analytical redundancy. 
2.2. Fault Detection Methods  
The traditional approaches to failure detection were based on hardware redundancy or 
signal processing techniques such as frequency spectrum analysis, limit checking or fault 
dictionary approach. The modern approach to the FDII is model based in which the 
failure detection scheme makes use of mathematical model of the system and knowledge 
based approach in which human knowledge of reasoning is used to detect and diagnose 
failures. FDII methods utilize parameter identification and state estimation, detection 
filters, statistical pattern recognition, multiple model estimators, maximum likelihood 
techniques and bayes theorem. In analytical methods a mathematical model acts as a 
substitute to the redundant hardware and is used to compare and monitor it with the 
actual system. One prime requirement of the algorithms is that they are simple enough to 
fit on the onboard computer and fast enough to provide a real-time calculation for safe 
and reliable system at the onset of a fault. Additionally, they should be robust enough to 
provide nominal performance in presence of parameter variations, turbulence and 
coupling effects during maneuvers.  The analytical redundancy has its implicit fallbacks. 
One of the challenges in this process of model based method is to obtain an accurate 
mathematical model for complex systems. Poor modeling leads to more probability of 
false alarms and detections. However, the appeal to analytical methods lies in the fact that 
there no additive physical instrumentation in the plant. The analytical based methods can 
be classified into model based6,7 and the knowledge based8,9 or a combination of 
both10.The model based method is normally implemented as a software algorithm. The 
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earliest work on FDII is through the use of estimation filter11, failure detection filter12, 
band limiting filters 13 and innovations   tests14 15 16. 
2.2.1. Model Based Methods 
These types of methods make explicit use of mathematical model of the system. The 
method relies on residual generation and decision making. The signals from the system 
are initially processed to enhance the effect of fault so that it can be recognized. These 
processed measurements are called residuals and the enhanced effect of fault on the 
residuals is called the signature of the fault. Analytical redundancy methods are based on 
detection, isolation and identification of failures from the comparison of system’s 
available measurements with the prior information represented by system’s mathematical 
models17. The failures are detected by setting fixed thresholds on the residuals generated 
from difference between real and estimates of the measurement using the mathematical 
model. A number of residuals can be designed with each having its own sensitivity to 
detect a failure. There are many methods for residual generation in which observer 
approach19,20, parity relations approach21,22 and the parameter identification approach23 
have been widely used among early researchers. 
 
The basic idea behind observer approach is the estimation of system outputs from 
the measurements by either full order or reduced order state observers. A suitable 
weighting of output estimation error is defined as the residual. This approach has 
advantages because of it’s flexibility in design, the relative ease of obtaining robustness, 
algorithms and software simplicity and the speed of response in detecting and isolating 
failures. The parity relations approach is based either on a technique of direct redundancy 
i.e. making use of static algebraic relationships between sensor and actuator signals or 
based on temporal redundancy when dynamic relations between inputs and outputs are 
used. An interesting feature of parity space methods for FDII is that given certain design 
conditions, the parity equation residual signals can become identical to those from 
observer approach. This has been described by Massoumnia24 and Patton25. The parameter 
identification approach makes use of the fact that failures are reflected in physical 
parameters such as friction, mass, viscosity, resistance, inductance or capacitance. This 
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approach is used to detect failures via the estimation or identification of model 
parameters using a non-parametric model. 
 
The FDII for stochastic systems are based on statistical testing of the residuals. The 
noted work in this area is by Willsky using Chi-Squared Testing17, Basseville using 
Sequential probability ratio testing18 and Willsky using Generalized Likelihood Ratio17. In 
order to reduce the noise of residuals the residual generator has to accommodate the noise 
in the generation of residuals. The Kalman filter technique is a common approach to 
generate residuals. The structure of a Kalman filter is similar to an observer and is based 
on stochastic model of the dynamic system. If the system is nominal then the normalized 
innovation sequence in a correlated Kalman filter is a Gaussian white noise with zero 
mean and a unit covariance matrix6.  Failures leads to changes in system dynamics 
causing drifts of the state vector components, abnormal measurements, sudden shifts in 
measurement channels leading to a drift from near zero mean and a change in the 
covariance matrix. The detection of the failure is based on detecting changes in these 
parameters from their nominal values. Some variants of Kalman filter include multiple 
model adaptive filters and two stage bias correction filters. 
 
Kalman filtering techniques have been widely used for failure detection. Of these 
the work done by Mehra 6,7 makes use of multiple hypothesis EKF and several Kalman 
filters running in parallel and switching decision is based on innovation sequence and 
likelihood function of each filter. One drawback of these methods is detection delays due 
to likelihood functions for active hypothesis. To address detection delays issues an 
Interactive Multiple Models7 (IMM) approach with Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) is 
more time efficient than Multi hypothesis EKF. The failure detection scheme consists of 
representing each failure by a model and combining the outputs of EKFs based on 
different models in an optimal way. So in addition to fast failure detection it also provides 
a near optimal estimate of states as well. The IMM approach has been applied to 
spacecraft autonomy of failure detection and identification for sensors (gyros, star 
tracker) and actuator failures. Similar work by Eide37 uses a bank of Kalman filters 
modeled to match a particular hypothesis of real world.   
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2.2.2. Knowledge Based Methods  
Control theory and artificial intelligence (AI) strive to harness mathematics and logic for 
problem solving however control theory finds it’s origin in dynamics and electronics 
while the AI springs from biology, psychology and computer science. Knowledge based 
methods offer a new dimension to the fault detection methods where analytical methods 
fail because of unavailability of accurate models that represent the physical system. 
Therefore the knowledge based methods offer alternatives to analytical based methods or 
may complement it. AI techniques like Neural Networks and Fuzzy logic have been 
extensively used for failure detection by many researchers lately.  Neural networks are 
motivated by the input-output relationships and learning properties of living neurons. 
Initially due to limited computational capacity of computers, the training of neural 
networks were found to be unworkable 34,35. Artificial NNs consists of nodes that simulate 
the neurons and weighing factors that simulate the synapse of living neurons. There are 
many advantages of NNs in performing a variety of fault tolerant systems because of 
their speed, ability to model non-linear functions, ease of modeling multidimensional 
problems and capability of learning with experience. 
 
In order to formulate failure detection logic where mathematical modeling is hard 
to realize various knowledge based methods are used. Although mathematical models 
that describe the dynamic behavior of faults is present, yet the problem-solving actually 
used by pilots and human operators are fairly more than quantitative. According to 
Handelman26 there is a need for incorporating a human like reasoning ability in flight 
control systems. The artificial intelligence concepts like neural networks and fuzzy logic 
strive to emulate the human thought process by computer and therefore provided good 
alternative to mathematical techniques. There have been used extensively among 
researchers because of ease of modeling uncertainties and non-linearities by expert 
systems. The problem is handled by Neural Networks52 53 54 55 56 or fuzzy logic49 or a 
combination in the form of Neuro-fuzzy systems60 61 62 .The work by Chiang 61 approaches 
the problem with a Neuro-fuzzy logic in which the neural network is capable of 
approximating a non-linear function if there are sufficient number of neurons. The fuzzy 
logic augments the system by developing a physical understanding by setting linguistic 
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rules. The global nature of the system is handled by the fuzzy system while neural 
network handles the local variables in real time. Similar work on a Neuro fuzzy system 
by Al-Jarrah 62 uses neural network for online learning and fuzzy system to handle 
uncertainties in the system. This is compared with work by Polycarpou60 and has a better 
tracking error performance and approximations of the functions. 
 
A FDII technique requires knowledge of system behavior by the FCS be available at any 
operating point at a heavy computational and storage costs. NNs have gained interest 
because they maintain the save level of FD capability without increasing the 
computational burden. The mapping property of the NN architecture is attractive when 
the input-output are related to completely or partially unknown dynamics. The NN 
implementation in the design on the estimator can be offline (frozen architecture) or 
online. The online learning is because of the advantageous as it provides flexibility to 
deal with variable dynamics and failure conditions.   
 
The actuator FDII have been extensively researched using neural networks 8,52,53 
and some of them have been flight tested as well. Due to availability of redundant sensors 
on an aircraft system however sensor FDII hasn’t gained attention comparable to actuator 
failures. Notable work in the area of FDII using neural networks is by Napolitano, 
Perhinschi in which they have demonstrated NNs efficacy in actuator FDII, sensor FDII 
and a combination of both. The scheme utilized two sets of NNs which monitor the 
angular rates in the aircraft. The cross-correlations of these rates indicate any anomaly in 
the aircraft system. In most of the work the fixed threshold approaches have been used 
for actuator48,54 and Integrated56,58 (sensor/actuator) FDII by them. From simulation results 
it was concluded that NNs were very helpful in modeling failure detection algorithms.  
 
Perhinschi 57 and others have extended the actuator failure FDII using an adaptive 
threshold which reduces the ratio of false alarms considerably. The use of Autoregressive 
Moving Average Filter (ARMA) in their approach of floating Limiter (FL) for thresholds 
of cross-correlations rates is the main source of inspiration of this research work. The 
adaptive threshold offers more robustness because it is based on an auto regressive filter 
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and therefore takes into account any disturbance induced by pilot. In the fixed threshold it 
is noticed that there are many false detection flags if a pilot is included in the loop. These 
approaches have been extended for an integrated sensor/actuator FDII and have a good 
performance in terms of failure detection accuracy and speed of detection. A similar work 
for sensor failure9 is done using an adaptive threshold concept. This FL approach is 
extended for an integrated sensor/actuator FDII scheme in this research work. The 
integrated scheme developed is also tested in a motion flight simulator to monitor pilot 
activity in case of the failure. The simulation capability of a motion simulator in terms of 
more realistic motion and visual cues are leveraged in this experimental study. The 
MOTUS simulator interface with the F-15 FDII schemes offers a new extension to 
existing simulation capabilities at WVU. It provides a more complex simulation 
environment to study pilot behavior and monitor the performance in a simulation 
environment comparable to a real flight. 
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Chapter 3. Theoretical Background 
3.1. Description of Gen-2 Scheme 
The NASA Intelligent Flight Control System (IFCS) F-15 program27 is aimed at 
development and testing of new control approaches using self learning neural networks 
that can optimize aircraft performance in both nominal and failure conditions. The 
explicit use of artificial intelligence techniques and on-line system identification 
algorithms have been used effectively in recent years for adaptive control systems. One 
of the advantages of these techniques over conventional control approaches is that they 
eliminate gain scheduling and also can handle a variety of control surface deflections. 
The control surface failures change the aircraft stability and control characteristics and 
render conventional control schemes ineffective. The general scheme architecture shown 
in Fig. 3-1 is taken from [46], named Gen-2 within the IFCS program, is based on an 
adaptive neural controller canceling the errors associated with the dynamic inversion of 
the model. In order to reduce the level of computational effort the control strategy38, 39, 40 
has been selected to provide consistent handling qualities and eliminate the need of gain-
scheduling or system identification. Initially, constant values of aerodynamic stability and 
control derivatives for a fixed condition in the flight envelope are used for model 



























Fig. 3-1-General Block Diagram for IFCS Gen-2 Controller Scheme [46] 
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3.1.1. NLDI scheme 
The mathematical model for Gen-238 is based on a Non-Linear Dynamic Inversion 
(NLDI) which uses pre-trained neural networks (PTNN) to obtain the stability and 
control derivatives. The scheme developed at WVU uses the stick commands as input to 







δ ) commands are converted into corresponding roll, pitch, and yaw 
rate commands ( comp , comq , comr ). A reference model provides filtered rate commands 
( refp , refq , refr ) and acceleration commands ( refp , refq , refr ) using first order roll rate and 
second order pitch and yaw rate transfer functions. The inputs to dynamic inversion 
( cp , cq , cr ) is a function of augmentation commands generated by NNs and pseudo control 
commands and is computed using the expression: 
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Where pK  and iK  are, respectively, proportional and integral constants 







δ ) are obtained with the following equation: 
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Where B is the state space system control matrix and the terms ( −c 1p L , −c 1q M , −c 1r N ) 
are the differences between input acceleration commands and actual plant acceleration 
contributions (L1, M1, N1). These plant contributions are function of inertial and 
geometric characteristics, aerodynamic derivatives, angular rates, and aerodynamic 
angles. Using first and second order transfer functions, the actual control surface actual 
deflections are computed. 
3.1.2. Neural Network Algorithms 
The NLDI scheme features three different types of adaptive NNs and this study is carried 
out for comparing the performance of these three different NN augmentations. These 
NNs serve the purpose of canceling the dynamic inversion errors. The first method 
Sigma-Pi, is based on a two-layer Sigma-Pi NN41,42 for each angular acceleration 
( p , q , r ). These NNs use proportional and integral acceleration errors ( _p errorU , _q errorU , 
_r errorU ) for on-line learning purpose. The pseudo control acceleration commands        
( pU , qU , rU ), bias terms, and sensor feedback are inputs to the neural networks. For each 
channel three terms C1, C2 and C3 are computed as functions of input variables and 






U ). The neural network gets its name 
because the neurons are summed and multiplied with each other. The neural network 
output is an additional control command for compensating the inversion errors and is 
calculated from Eq. (6). 
 
  ( )1 2 3, ,=
T
adU W f C C C                                     (6) 
 
where f is computed from each signal inputs using a nested Kronecker product. The 
network weights W are determined by an adaptation law: 
  ( )= − ⋅ + error errorW G U f L U W                                               (7) 
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where G and L are user selected specific gains. 
  
The EMRAN43 algorithm is an extension of the standard MRAN63 and is noted for its 
selective selection criterion of the neurons. The network features growing and pruning 
mechanisms and is based on the “survival of the fittest” strategy and updates parameters 
for the most activated neurons. This strategy allows only the parameters of the most 
activated neurons to be updated, while all the others are left unchanged. This strategy in 
suitable of online applications64 as it reduces the number of parameters to be updated and 
thus reduces computational burden. 
 
For Gaussian basis function used for EMRAN is given by the expression: 
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Where x is the input vector, θ  is the set of parameters to be tuned by the learning 
algorithm including the weight w, the Gaussian center positions µ , and the variancesσ . 
The EMRAN NN is activated once the criteria for the initiation of NN are met. The 
neuron is activated as soon as estimation error, windowed estimation error and distance 
of inputs from center cross its threshold. Once it is activated the center, variance, and 
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If the above criteria is not met the parameters are updated using the eq(10) 
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Where ( )e k  is the estimation error and η  is the learning rate 
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To achieve an optimum performance in the presence of non-linearities and to minimize 
the computational burden on the operating areas, a combination of ADALINE48 and an 
EMRAN network (A+EMRAN) working in parallel has been implemented on each of the 
three channels. 
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where ijw  are the interconnection weights between the hidden layer and the output layer, 
jkv  are the interconnection weights between the input layer and the hidden layer, and 
,vj wiθ θ  are bias terms. The activation potential ‘a’ is used to compute the activation 
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Fig. 3-2- The integration of NLDI based F-15 Controller with MFS 
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3.2. Aerodynamic Modeling of the failure 
The actuator failure modeling has been developed and applied in recent literature for 
longitudinal, lateral and directional control surface locking48. On the advent of a failure 
the stability and control derivatives changes and leads to a reduced “control surface 
effectiveness”. This is used to model the partial effectiveness once a control surface 
failure occurs. The sensor failure implies a bias induced in the sensor measurements 
which go in the feedback loop.  
3.2.1. Failure Detection and Identification concepts  
Since it is practically not feasible to have multiple channels of redundant primary control 
surfaces therefore actuator failures are major threats to safety of the flight. Each failure in 
an aircraft has a unique dynamic signature and hence it is not possible to pre-train pilots 
extensively for such situations. State estimation methods performance degrades in the 
presence of non-linearities and uncertainties. The augmentation of neural networks in 
FDII schemes handles modeling error52-56 and have been used in detection and 
identification criteria for primary control surfaces54,55.In this effort, this approach has 
been extended to an integrated actuator failures to detect and identify failures of the 
locked primary surfaces(stabilator, aileron and rudder) as well sensor failures for the roll, 
pitch and yaw rate gyros. The experimental set-up of the West Virginia University’s 
(WVU) MOTUS Flight simulator as a simulation test bed is used to evaluate the FDII 
schemes. The failures considered in research work are actuator locking and sensor bias 
type failures. 
3.2.2. The Adaptive Threshold Concept for FDII  
While the fixed threshold provides a FDII scheme capable of fairly accurate detection 
and identification for actuator and sensor failures 54, 58, they are however susceptible to 
false alarms and wrong identifications when pilot in included in the loop. The adaptive 
threshold approach for FDII offers advantage over a fixed threshold FDII because it 
eliminates any need for parameter scheduling with different flight conditions, thereby 
reducing the design effort. In addition to this the Floating Limiter approaches57 have 
demonstrated better performance in terms of detection delays and ratio of false alarms. 
The fixed threshold approach has to take into account the rate of variation of cross-
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correlation parameters and therefore has higher detection, isolation or identification time 
as some parameters require certain time for the signal to build up and cross the fixed 
threshold. On the other hand the FL limiter is crossed when ever there is an abrupt rise in 
parameters being monitored. The FDII scheme for integrated actuator/sensor failure is 
built on an adaptive ARMA (Auto Regressive Moving Average) filter termed Floating 
Limiter (FL) which fluctuates with an upper and lower bound around the signal. The 
signal experiences a sudden jump at failure which crosses the FL bounds and hence a 
failure alarm is triggered. 
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The FL limiter is used to evaluate the variable thresholds for the parameters monitored 
for FDII scheme. The soft and hard Upper and Lower bounds are computed as shown in 
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Where  
X = Average of signal computed over the time window 
σ =Standard deviation of the signal 
HUB
β =Bound factor for Hard Upper Limit 
HLB
β =Bound Factor for Hard Lower Limit 
SUB
β =Bound factor for Soft Upper Limit 
SLB
β =Bound Factor for Soft Lower Limit 
HUB
b =Bias for Hard Upper Bound 
HLB
b =Bias for Hard Lower Bound 
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SUB
b =Bias for Soft Upper Bound 
SLB
b =Bias for Soft Lower Bound 
 
A typical FL signal in a non-failure mode will drift constantly with the signal and the 
main signal will remain within bounds. On the advent of a failure the signal abruptly rises 
and cross the FL bounds. This is used as an indication of a possible failure. 
 
Figure 3-3- A FL approach to FDII showing the detection with MQEE 
 
3.2.3. The FL architecture for Integrated Sensor/Actuator Failure 
The concept of adaptive threshold in failure detection algorithms for actuator 57 and 
sensor9 failures is extended to an integrated S/AFDII scheme using the FL approach. The 
scheme is based on monitoring the outputs of Floating Limiter (FL)65,66 bounds for the 
signal in consideration. The signals are mostly the cross-correlation coefficients of 
angular rates by the aircraft. The FL fluctuates around the signal and drift with a rate of 
the signal but less than an imposed limit. The block diagram for the FL is shown in 
Figure 3-4. The FL consists of two low pass filters in which one of them is Infinite 
impulse response and the other is finite impulse response. The filter allows the signal to 
move within bounds which drift with the rate of signal. The FL Simulink block is shown 
in Figure 3-5. 
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Figure 3-4- Block Diagram of Floating Limiter 
 
 
Figure 3-5- Simulink block showing Bounds of Floating Limiter 
3.2.4. The Adaptive Threshold Parameters for S/AFDII Scheme 
The FDII scheme is divided into three main steps mainly 
Detection: The failure of an unspecified kind (Actuator/Sensor) is detected; 
Isolation: The detected failure is differentiated between an actuator and a sensor failure. 
Identification: The isolated failure is identified to be a stabilator, aileron, or rudder 
failure if there is actuator failure and a roll, pitch, yaw gyro if there is sensor failure. 
 
The FDII scheme rests on two different sets of NNs; Main Neural Networks (MNNs) and 
the Decentralized Neural Networks (DNNs) for monitoring the FDII parameters. These 
parameters are basically cross-correlation functions of the aircraft angular rates. The 







r ) at time ‘k’, using measurements from time instant ‘k-1’ to ‘k-m’. 
The inputs to the MNNs may include the respective gyro measurements. The outputs of 






r )and does not 
include measurements from sensors. 
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r ) to define the main quadratic estimation error ( MQEE ) parameter: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 21
2
actual MNN actual MNN actual MNN
MQEE p p q q r r = − + − + −
 
                 (17) 
 
A NN output quadratic estimation error (OQEE ) parameter is defined by comparing the 
estimates from the MNNs and DNNs: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 21
2
DNN MNN DNN MNN DNN MNN
OQEE p p q q r r = − + − + −
 
     (18) 
 
Both MQEE and OQEE are used in the detection phase. 







R (k) R (i)
= −





R (k) R (i)
= −
= ∑                      (20) 
 
The cross-coupling parameters  pqR  induces a strong perturbation in case of an actuator 
failure particularly stabilator and aileron. Since a sensor failure has very slow effect on 
cross-coupling so the rise is not abrupt and the time interval can be used for isolation. 
Similarly rrR increase is abrupt for a rudder failure compared to a yaw sensor failure and 
can isolate the failure. 
 
The other is an angular rate dominance parameter representing the weighted difference of 




p qω µ= −                      (21) 
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A stabilator failure induces both p and q perturbations and hence 
pq
ω  is significantly 
lower than for an aileron failure which doesn’t have an appreciable pitch rate. There is 
roll rate variation in aileron failure without affecting the pitch rate and hence pqω  rises 
fast in comparison to stabilator failure. This can be used to distinguish between 
stabilator/aileron failures. 
3.2.5. The detection phase 
The occurrence of a primary control surface failure produces a perturbation of the normal 
dynamic response of the aircraft. This translates into large errors between the measured 
angular rates and the MNN estimates, in particular large values of MQEE , and/or large 










                    (22) 
It should be noted that actuator failure corresponds to a large and a faster variation in 
MQEE  while sensor failures have a large and faster variation of OQEE  
3.2.6. The Isolation phase 
Once a failure is detected it is essential to differentiate between an actuator and a sensor 
failure. In general, the actuator failures induces strong cross coupling in angular rates as 
opposed to sensor failures. A failure to any of the actuators will induce a coupling 
between the longitudinal and lateral or directional channel. In turn, this implies large 
values of the roll-pitch rate cross-correlation function. Therefore, the criterion for 
preliminary identification is shown in eq. (23) 
 
pq pq _ FL rr rr _ FL 1
pq pq _ FL rr rr _ FL 1
R R R R & t t Actuator Failure
else
R R R R & t t Sensor Failure
≥ ∨ ≥ ∆ ≥ ∆ ⇒
≤ ∨ ≤ ∆ ≥ ∆ ⇒
    (23) 
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It should be noted that pqR  varies slower for a sensor failure; therefore, a time interval up 
to 1t∆  should be allowed before a final preliminary failure isolation. 
3.2.7. Failure Identification for Actuator Isolated 
Three types of actuator failures are addressed here. Once the actuator failure is isolated it 
has to be differentiated as a stabilator, aileron or rudder failure.  
 
pq pq _ FL 2
pq pq _ FL 2
rr rr _ FL
& t t Aileron Failure
& t t Stabilator Failure
R R Rudder Failure
ω ≥ ω ∆ ≥ ∆ ⇒
ω ≤ ω ∆ ≥ ∆ ⇒
≥ ⇒
             (24) 
In case of isolation, a time interval up to 2t∆  should be allowed for pqω  to grow 
3.2.8. Failure Identification for Sensor Isolated 
On the advent of sensor failures MNN starts learning biased angular rates as it have the 
sensor values as inputs while DNN still calculates angular rates based on the flight 
parameters except the sensor values. The difference of actual angular rates and the 
respective rates from the DNNs trigger failure flags and are identified by monitoring the 
outputs of DNNs. In an advent of failure the DQEEs  cross their respective FL bounds 
and issues an identification flag which are given by eq. (25). 
 
p p _ FL
q q _ FL
r r _ FL
DQEE DQEE Roll Sensor Failure
DQEE DQEE Pitch Sensor Failure




          (25) 
 
The logical diagram of the FDII scheme for an actuator and sensor failure with above 








Rpq ≥ Rpq_FL 
or 
Rrr ≥ Rrr_FL 
 
START 








ωpq ≥  ωpq_FL 
2t t≥  
DQEEp ≥ DQEEp_FL 
DQEEq ≥ DQEEq_FL 
DQEEr ≥ DQEEr_FL 
NO 




Roll  Sensor Failure 
Rudder Failure 
Pitch  Sensor Failure 
Aileron Failure 
Stabilator Failure 
Yaw Sensor Failure 






















Figure 3-6 Logical Diagram for FDII 
 
The FL parameters are tuned by changing the bound factor and bias by running the 
failure simulations till the number of false alarms is reduced. The tuned FL parameters 
are shown in Table 3-1. These were obtained by running the simulation for a number of 





Floating Limit Parameter 










MQEE  1.4 0.00001 3.0 0.00001 
floating
OQEE  1.2 0.00005 6.0 0.00005 
_pq floatingR  
1.5 0.001 6.0 0.001 
_rr floatingR  
1.5 0.001 3.0 0.001 
_pq floatingω  
1.2 0.003 3.0 0.003 
_p floatingDQEE  
1.5 0.002 3.0 0.002 
_q floatingDQEE  
2.0 0.00001 6.0 0.00001 
_r floatingDQEE  
1.5 0.00001 3.0 0.00001 
Table 3-1 Floating Limiter Tuning Parameters for Integrated FDII Scheme 
3.3. Integrated Sensor/Actuator S/AFDII Scheme with FL  
The Simulink scheme shown in Fig. 3-7 is developed and the FDII block is incorporated 
in Gen-2 controller scheme and it issues failure warnings using the GUI. The inputs to the 
FDII scheme is the sensors values and they are processed separately by the MNNs and 
DNNs to monitor the correlations coefficients such as , , ,
pq pq
MQEE DQEE R ω .The FDII 
makes use of the logic shown in Figure 3-6 to detect, isolate and identify the failure. The 
output of the FDII block is also channeled to the X-plane visuals to send the same 
warning into the cockpit to warn the pilot about the failure. 
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Fig. 3-7-Integrated Simulink scheme for S/AFDIA with Floating Limiter and MFS Interface 
The detailed FDII block is shown in Fig. 3-8 and the outputs from MNNs and DNNs are 
processed to detect, isolate and identify the failure. The FDII block consists of a display 
warning system for the failure. 
 
Fig. 3-8-S/AFDIA Scheme incorporating the Floating Limiters 
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The typical failure warning window in the Simulink scheme is shown in Figure 3-9.It 
pops up when the failure is initially detected. Similarly Figure 3-10 is a snap shot of GUI 
pop up when the actuator failure is identified.  At the same time the outputs of the failure 
warning block are sent to the UDP block to display a text message warning the pilot 
about the failure once the detection takes place within the Simulink scheme. A typical 
warning received in cockpit is shown in Figure 3-11. 
 
Figure 3-9 A warning window with Failure Detection 
 
 




Figure 3-11 Typical Warning received at lower left corner of pilot facing visual display 
 
These warnings in the cockpit provide the pilot a notification of the failure and augment 
his response in handling the failure. Thus in addition to the aural, visual and motion cues 























Chapter 4. Experimental Procedures 
4.1. Experimental Environment Setup 
The experiments are set up by interfacing the Flight Simulation Research Computer 
(FSRC) with the MOTUS flight simulator (MFS). The F-15 Gen-2 schemes run on the 
FSRC and it is interfaced with MFS. A conventional joystick shown in Fig. 4-1 is used 
for all piloted experiments and it is used as an input device to the Simulink scheme. The 
cockpit controls of the flight simulator are replaced by this joystick for sake of 
convenience and also because the joystick is more realistic for flying a fighter aircraft. 
The joystick is provisioned to be placed in the cockpit by making a fitment shown in   
Fig. 4-2. This fitment ensures that the joystick remains secure in the cockpit and 
eliminates any need for the pilot to hold it in hands or lap. Additionally, in order to 
monitor the variables that are sent to the motion base from Simulink scheme an external 
monitor is hooked to one of the VGA outputs of the simulator mainframe. It is shown in 
Figure 4-3. 
 
Fig. 4-1- Joystick Used for Piloted Experiments 
 
 
Fig. 4-2-Fitment Placed in Cockpit to Place the joystick 
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Figure 4-3 Externally Hooked Monitor to inspect the Motion Base Data 
4.1.1. Description of MOTUS Flight Simulator 
The MOTUS flight simulator is a state of the art flight simulator consisting of five 
computers communicating with each other and synchronizing information by means of a 
central computer called the server computer. X-plane is the flight simulation software 
running simultaneously on all five computers and the communication is through intranet 
among the computers. The sever computer controls the other 4 computers as well as the 
Motion Base Computer (MBC). The MBC converts the accelerations into the inputs for 
motion base actuator motors which provide the desired motion cues. It should be noted 
that the algorithm for MBC is proprietary software by Fidelity Flight Inc. and there is no 
direct method to change the software parameters. The following are the main systems of 
the Motus Simulator 
 
Computer 1 – This is visual display No. 1 which forms the side left view. 
Computer 2 – This is Visual Display No. 2 which forms the forward view.  
Computer 3 - This is Visual Display No. 3 which forms the side right view.  
Computer 4- This is the Server and displays the cockpit view showing instrument  
          Panels 
Computer 5- This is Instructor Console and used for changing the flight  





Motion Base Control Box: This is used to bring the motion base to kneel or flying mode 
and is shown in Figure 4-4. 
 
 
Figure 4-4- Motion Base Control Box 
4.1.2. Description of X-plane Software 
X-plane software67 is the heart of the MOTUS visual and aural flight simulation 
environment. It is developed by Laminar Research and features good graphics, an 
external user interface and ability to design and custom the aircrafts and scenery. The 
software has features to input and output the data pertaining to the flight simulation and it 
features a Software Development Kit (SDK) that allows users to set up communication 
with X-plane software by means of User Datagram Protocol (UDP). The UDP data can 
be sent /received by X-plane by means of writing external plugins which are essentially 
Dynamically Linked Libraries (DLLs). All plugins are managed by X-plane Plugin 
Manager (XPLM) which controls the data handling within the software. This feature is 
effectively utilized for this research effort and the Simulink based schemes are modified 
to communicate with X-plane and Motion Base Computer (MBC) in the MOTUS flight 
simulator by writing suitable plugins. 
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4.2. Interface of Simulink Scheme with Motion Simulator 
The prime objective of the Simulink® interface with MFS is to create an efficient test bed 
to simulate advanced F-15 Gen-2 schemes. The basic idea behind using the simulator was 
to obtain motion and visual cues for these Simulink schemes and create an advanced 
simulation environment than desktop simulation. The schematic of the interface is shown 
in Figure 4-5 and it can be seen that the joystick inclusion in the cockpit creates a 
feedback loop. The instructor console set-up is shown in Figure 4-6 which shows the 
research computer and the The foremost part of the interface was to identify the 
parameters necessary to obtain the necessary visual and motion cues for the Simulink® 
scheme. The parameters required to produce the desired visual cue were identified based 
on understanding the X-plane simulation set-up. The X-plane loads the scenery based on 
latitude and longitude information on a spherical earth. The aircraft is placed on the earth 
based by specifying the Euler angles and altitude and therefore the visual cues are 
obtained from the X-plane based on the location of the aircraft in terms of altitude, 
latitude and longitude and it defines the position of the aircraft on the globe. The 
deflections of the primary control surfaces need to be specified and they formed other 
important parameters in the visual cues. Thirdly the spatial orientations i.e. Euler angles 
are transformed to Quaternion in the X-plane. The parameters that are used to obtain the 




Figure 4-5 A schematic of the MFS interface with the Gen-2 Simulink Scheme for experiments 
 
 





Variable X-Plane DataRef 




Roll rate sim/flightmodel/position/P 
Pitch rate sim/flightmodel/position/Q 
Yaw rate sim/flightmodel/position/R 
Throttle Sim/flightmodel/engine/ENGN_thro_override 
Aileron def Sim/joystick/artstab_roll_ratio 
Elevator def Sim/joystick/artstab_pitch_ratio 
Rudder def sim/joystick/artstab_heading_ratio 
Table 4-1 : Data Sent to X-Plane for Visual Cue 
 
 
Variable X-Plane DataRef 
Total Airspeed Sim/flightmodel//position/groundspeed 
Angle of Attack sim/flightmodel//position/alpha 
Pitch Acceleration sim/flightmodel//position/Q_dot 
Yaw Acceleration sim/flightmodel//position/R_dot 
Roll Acceleration sim/flightmodel//position/P_dot 
Side Acceleration Sim/flightmodel//forces/g_side 
Normal Acceleration Sim/flightmodel//forces/g_nrml 
Axial Acceleration Sim/flightmodel//forces/g_axil 
Pitch Angle Sim/flightmodel//position/theta 
Yaw Angle Sim/flightmodel//position/beta 
Roll Angle Sim/flightmodel//position/phi 
Table 4-2- Data Sent to Motion base for Motion Cue 
4.2.1. Motion Computer Data and Displays 
In order to check whether correct data is sent to the motion base, an external monitor is 
hooked to the MBC. During the flight experiments the data on the monitor can be 
checked with the ones in the Simulink schemes. The format of the data is specified by the 
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manufacturer and should strictly adhere to the format shown in Table 4-3. These indicate 
the order in which data is received and can be compared with the Simulink data. 
 
Table 4-3- Motion Base Computer Data Format for Receiving via UDP 
 
The motion data is sent through the Simulink scheme since the objective is to obtain the 
motion cues based on the Gen-2 control algorithms. The software designed by Fidelity 
Flight Inc within MFS for driving motion base automatically adjusts the acceleration 
received from the X-plane within the prescribed limits but it is not the case with us. Thus 
we have placed a hard limit on the accelerations limits as prescribed by the manufacturer 
as shown in Table 4-4. A couple of tests were carried out to ensure the accelerations 
experienced for the tests are within the limits. The accelerations can be monitored while 
running the experiments while they are sent to the motion base. A generic external 
monitor used and connected to VGA output of MBC. The data received is shown in a 
zoomed view in Figure 4-7. 
Acceleration Limits 
Pitch Acceleration 2
30 deg/ sec±  
Yaw Acceleration 2
30 deg/ sec±  
Roll Acceleration 2
30 deg/ sec±  
Side Acceleration 3 g±  
Normal Acceleration 3 g±  
Axial acceleration 3 g±  




Figure 4-7 The external monitor showing the Motion Base data  
 
This interface is divided into two main blocks. 
1. X-plane visual UDP interface  
2. Motion Base UDP interface  
The 2 interfaces are s-functions custom built for obtaining the visual and motion cues for 
the Simulink model. 
4.2.2. UDP interface and IP address settings for Communications 
The main objective was to carry out simulation experiments for the neurally augmented 
failure detection schemes in the flight simulator. To accomplish this, two different          
S-function were written in the Simulink scheme to send UDP data to the X-plane and the 
motion computer. Figure 4-8 shows the Simulink scheme with the UDP interface block 
for this particular study. Figure 4-9 shows the UDP interface block in detail. The visual 
UDP block asks for user to input the IP address of the server computer in order to make a 
communication with X-plane. When the user clicks on the visual block, a window shown 
in Figure 4-10 prompts the user to specify the IP address. Similarly, a pop up block 




In addition to these, two plugins for X-plane whose objective is to receive the data sent 
by Simulink scheme via s-function discussed before were created. These plugins 
communicate with the central plugin called X-plane Plugin Manager (XPLM). The        
X-plane software doesn’t allow any communication directly and therefore all 
communications are channeled through the XPLM. The syntax and procedure for writing 
customized plugin for X-plane can be found in Software Development Kit (SDK) at the 
manufacturer website. 
 
There are few things which must be taken into account while running the experiments 
using this interface. Foremost the Simulink scheme should be running before X-plane is 
started. This is necessary to open UDP ports for the X-plane plugins. Also, it clears 
previous buffer from the memory of X-plane.  The X-plane dial for the indicated airspeed 
uses knots for display. We have adjusted it to display speed in m/sec for our convenience 
and for consistency with the Simulink model. 
 




Figure 4-9- UDP interface Block in the F-15 Simulation Scheme 
 
Figure 4-10- POP up window to specify IP address of the Motus Server machine for Visual UDP interface 
 
 
Figure 4-11 POP up window to specify IP address of the Motus Server machine for Motion UDP interface 
As mentioned earlier the five computers interact with each other through Ethernet 
connections. The server houses the IP addresses of the other machines. The visual display 
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computers should have IP address of the server. The snapshot of the server computer 
should have for the IP address settings is shown in Figure 4-12.These should be strictly 
selected as shown in figure else it could desynchronize the visual and instructor console 
with the server computer.  
 
 
Figure 4-12 IP settings and UDP setting for Server Computer 
4.2.3. Pilot interaction and Warning Systems in the Cockpit 
The pilot is included in the loop by placing the joystick in the cockpit as shown in Figure 
4-13 and the flight experiments are conducted in a controlled fashion and many a times it 
is necessary to warn the pilot about the type of work he is expected to do. It can be 
anything from notifying in advance about a maneuver about to hit or to instruct him to 




Figure 4-13 Joystick Placed in the Cockpit 
 
 
Figure 4-14-Pilot warning about an oncoming maneuver 
Since the objective is pilot in the loop assessment therefore a warning system is also 
developed to display failure messages in the cockpit. As soon as the simulink FDII block 
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detects and identifies a failure it is communicated to the pilot by way of a text warning as 
shown in Figure 4-15 on the bottom left corner. These warning can be enabled/disabled 
by using F1/F2 keys from the server computer.  The instructor console computer is used 
to visually observe the flight experiments and Figure 4-16 shows a chase view of the 
simulation.  
 




Figure 4-16- Instructor Console Snapshot for monitoring the flight experiments 
4.3. Description of Simulink software 
A desktop based simulation environment46 is developed in Simulink for the F-15 Gen-2 
control scheme. The model was originally derived from a high performance fighter 
aircraft non-linear code distributed at the 1990 AIAA GNC Design Challenge47 by 
NASA. The model efficiently embedded in the Simulink environment and the Graphic 
User Interface (GUI) to create a user friendly simulation environment. Two types of 
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control surface failure have been modeled. The first failure type corresponds to an 
actuator mechanism failure and results in a locked surface; in fact, at the failure 
occurrence, the control surface remains fixed in the current or in a user prescribed 
position. Any of the individual six control surfaces may be subject to a failure: left or 
right stabilator, aileron, and rudder. The second failure types correspond to induced 
drifting biases of the angular rate sensor output and are implemented as sensor failures56. 
The user can select between different transients as well as different sizes of the bias for a 
total of six different sensor failures. 
4.3.1. The Simulink graphic user interface 
Figure 4-17 shows the typical interface of the Simulink Graphic User Interface (GUI) 
scheme for user friendly selection menu for choosing the flight scenarios. The left hand 
side of Figure 4-17 enables the user to choose the type of flight scenario. Once it is 
selected then it is required to choose the simulation scenario which has different options 
like nominal, actuator failure without FDI, actuator failure with FDI etc. 
  
 
Figure 4-17- Main GUI window for Flight Scenario Selection  
After selecting the desired simulation scenario the next window shown in Figure 4-18 
gives user the option to select the mode of pilot input. The input can be all generated by 
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joystick, pre-recorded or a combination of both. If the pre-recorded input is chosen it 
must be included in the parent directory. 
 
Figure 4-18- Input command selection window 
With the selection of inputs the 3rd GUI window shown in Figure 4-19 pops up which 
prompt the user to select the type of NN for the scheme. Figure 4-20 shows the GUI pop 
up window to define the actuator failure parameters. The user has option to introduce a 
particular failure at a particular time instant and deflection. Similarly Figure 4-21 shows 
the selection of sensor failure scenarios.  
 
 




Figure 4-20- Defining the actuator failure parameters 
 
 





Chapter 5. Results and Evaluation 
5.1. Overview of the experiments 
The goal of this research effort is the evaluation of the pilot-in-loop performance of the 
fault tolerant flight control schemes under different flight conditions (nominal/failure) as 
well as for different class of failures (actuator/sensor). There were primarily two broad 
objectives of the study. Firstly, to compare the performance of three NN augmented 
schemes and secondly to evaluate the adaptive FDII schemes with a pilot in the loop in 
the flight simulator. The different phases of the experiments can be divided into the 
following scenarios: 
1. Nominal Condition 
2. Failure Conditions with no FDII  
3. Failure Condition with Adaptive FDII scheme 
5.2. Comparison of different NN schemes with Actuator failure (NO FDII) 
To begin with baseline experiments were first conducted for nominal flight conditions. 
Pre-generated doublet maneuver along the longitudinal and lateral channel as shown in 
Fig. 5-1 is used as a baseline test estimate the performance of the NN schemes. At this 
point there is no pilot in the loop and the test served to validate the prior established 
performance. 
 
Fig. 5-1-Pre-generated Doublet for longitudinal and lateral channel  
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5.2.1. Tracking Error Performance for Nominal Condition (Baseline 
Doublets) 
The TE statistics for comparing the NN schemes for the longitudinal doublet maneuver 
shown in Table 5-1 
 
Figure 5-2-Tracking Error for Longitudinal Doublet 
 
TE No NN Sigma-Pi EMRAN SHL 
Mean Roll x10e-4 4.7978 4.8227 -1.4091 4.7296 
Mean Pitch x10e-4 -1.1241 -1.4045 1.1829 -1.2762 
Mean Yaw x10e-5 6.7871 6.7671 -5.2985 6.7599 
SD Roll x10e-3 4.5470 4.5443 4.7688 4.5454 
SD Pitch x10e-2 2.8178 2.8278 3.1351 2.8124 
SD Yaw x10e-4 4.1754 4.1672 4.9050 4.1739 
Table 5-1 Longitudinal Doublet TE – (Nominal Condition) 
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Figure 5-3- Tracking Error for Lateral Doublet 
 
TE No NN Sigma-Pi EMRAN SHL 
Mean Roll x10e-4 1.5575 1.5916 -0.25313 1.5552 
Mean Pitch x10e-3 -2.8190 -2.8747 -1.7086 -2.8110 
Mean Yaw x10e-3 -1.2636 -1.2633 -0.3650 -1.2650 
SD Roll x10e-1 2.3504 2.3541 1.7207 2.3487 
SD Pitch x10e-2 1.5643 1.5895 1.4898 1.5623 
SD Yaw x10e-2 1.0075 1.0098 0.35934 1.0094 
Table 5-2 Latéral Doublet TE Statistics (Nominal Condition) 
 
The tracking error (TE), defined as the difference between the rates generated by the 
reference model and the actual aircraft rates is an important indicator of neural networks 
performance. The TE along the pitch channel for a longitudinal maneuver and the pitch 
and roll channels for a lateral maneuver are considered for analysis in the following 
sections. For the purposes of this study, the TE statistics on each channel is computed 
over a 20 sec time window around the pre-generated longitudinal maneuvers and           
10 second window for the lateral maneuver, starting from the instant the maneuver 
occurs.   Figs. 7-8 show the comparison of the TE for the pre-generated maneuvers along 
the longitudinal and lateral channels, with and without NN compensation and the 
corresponding statistics are tabulated in Table 5-1 and Table 5-2. It can be seen that the 
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effect of NN augmentation is negligible, and may be attributed to small inversion errors 
and periodic updating of aerodynamic coefficients. 
5.2.2. Analysis of Actuator Failures (No pilot- No FDII) 
Following the nominal condition experiments with pre-generated maneuvers, failures on 
the left stabilator and right aileron, as shown in Table 5-3 and Table 5-4, were simulated 
and the performance of the control laws evaluated (no pilot in loop). For failure cases, the 
TE statistics on each channel is computed over a 20 sec time window around the failure 
instant, beginning 5 seconds before the failure. 
TE No NN Sigma-Pi EMRAN SHL 
Mean Roll x10e0 -0.6215 -0.4274 -0.2719 -0.6217 
Mean Pitch x10e0 0.2409 0.1865 0.1155 0.2410 
Mean Yaw x10e-2 -5.1404 -5.0736 -5.7683 -5.1420 
SD Roll x10e0 2.4756 2.3646 2.5454 2.4756 
SD Pitch x10e0 1.0592 1.0462 1.0386 1.0592 
SD Yaw x10e0 0.1997 0.2075 0.2211 0.1997 
Table 5-3 -Stabilator Failure TE Statistics (No Pilot) 
 
TE No NN Sigma-Pi EMRAN SHL 
Mean Roll x10e0 0.2420 0.2172 0.1420 0.2420 
Mean Pitch x10e-4 -2.7736 -2.8866 -2.3183 -2.7616 
Mean Yaw x10e-4 -3.6941 -4.0079 -1.2083 -3.6968 
SD Roll x10e0 1.5420 1.5309 1.5969 1.5420 
SD Pitch x10e-2 1.1089 1.1282 1.1239 1.1089 
SD Yaw x10e-3 5.7585 5.7924 7.5842 5.7584 
Table 5-4 Aileron Failure TE Statistics (No Pilot) 
 
  
Table 5-3 shows the TE statistics for the stabilator failure scenario (no pilot in the loop). 
The EMRAN performed better in comparison to the other NNs, reducing the mean of 
pitch tracking error by nearly 50% as compared to a no NN case. Table 5-4 shows the TE 
statistics for the aileron failure case. As in the case of the stabilator failure, the EMRAN 
performs better, reducing the mean of roll TE by nearly 40% TE and mean of pitch TE by 
15%. The analysis also shows that the neural augmentation using the SHL NN has an 
adverse effect on the TE performance. 
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5.2.3. Analysis of Actuator Failures (With Pilot- No FDII) 
The same failure conditions were now simulated with 3 different pilots that were selected 
from among the students in the WVU flight simulation course. Prior to conducting the 
experiments, the pilots were briefed about the nature of the failures and also instructed to 
maintain wings level flight after the failure. A specific objective of this phase of the study 
was to compare the level of pilot activity/compensation in the absence and presence of 
NN augmentation and to analyze the associated TE statistics.  With Pilot 1 in the loop, for 
the stabilator failure, it can be seen in Figure 5-4 that the EMRAN is the best performer, 
with the mean TE on the pitch and roll channels reduced as compared to the no NN case. 
The mean TE statistics is reduced by 50-55%, and is shown in Table 5-5. 
 
Figure 5-4   TE with different NN (Stab. Failure, Pilot1) 
 
TE No NN Sigma-Pi EMRAN SHL 
Mean Roll x10e0 -.5928 -.5445 -.2469 -.6156 
Mean Pitch x10e0 .2177 .2143 .1199 .2317 
Mean Yaw x10e-2 4.7926 -5.0836 -5.6346 -4.9166 
SD Roll x10e0 2.5489 2.3546 2.4624 2.5094 
SD Pitch x10e0 1.0545 1.0244 1.0076 1.0295 
SD Yaw x10e0 1.9724 2.0122 2.2005 1.9538 
Table 5-5 Stabilator Failure TE Statistics (Pilot 1) 
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Similarly, for an aileron failure, EMRAN outperforms the other networks, effectively 
reducing the mean TE in the pitch channel by nearly 77% and roll channel by about 58%.  
The corresponding results are tabulated in Table 5-6 and shown in Figure 5-5. It can also 
be seen that the SHL network has negligible effect on the tracking error statistics in both 
the pitch and roll channels for both failure cases.  
 
 
Figure 5-5- TE with different NN (Ail. Failure, Pilot1) 
 
TE No NN Sigma-Pi EMRAN SHL 
Mean Roll x10e-1 2.8866 2.5512 1.2169* 2.8644 
Mean Pitch x10e-4 -2.1266 -7.7528 1.3627* -12.885 
Mean Yaw x10e-3 -1.0142 -1.0213 -1.6379 -10.229 
SD Roll x10e0 1.7463 1.7031 1.7454 1.7585 
SD Pitch x10e-2 1.1651 1.2283 1.4529 1.8851 
SD Yaw x10e-3 8.0870 7.4486 9.4841 10.103 
Table 5-6 Aileron Failure TE Statistics (Pilot 1) 
 
 
With Pilot 2 in the loop, for the stabilator failure, Sigma-Pi and EMRAN NNs are 
comparable in TE performance in the stabilator failure with a 40% decrease in pitch TE. 
On the other hand, the Sigma-Pi outperforms the EMRAN along the roll channel. The 
tracking error statistics are shown in 
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 and Figure 5-6. The SHL NN actually degrades the performance in pitch TE, by 25%.  
 
Figure 5-6- Stabilator Failure TE with different NN (Pilot 2) 
 
TE No NN Sigma-Pi EMRAN SHL 
Mean Roll x10e0 -.5845 -.4564 -.9027 -.8390 
Mean Pitch x10e0 .2196 .1914* .1956 .2716 
Mean Yaw x10e-2 -4.5483 -4.6421 -4.5490 -3.6780 
SD Roll x10e0 2.5092 2.3910 3.3773 3.1885 
SD Pitch x10e0 1.0231 .9995 1.1218 1.1479 
SD Yaw x10e-1 1.9522 1.9547 1.3337 1.2997 
Table 5-7 Stabilator Failure TE Statistics (Pilot 2) 
 
On the other hand, for the aileron failure, the EMRAN performs the best with the mean of 
TE reduced considerably as compared with a no NN case. It shows a 65% reduction in 
mean TE along the roll channel and approximately 80% reduction in mean TE along 
pitch.  The statistics are listed in Table 5-8 and the TE performance shown in Figure 5-7.  
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Figure 5-7 Aileron Failure TE with different NN (Pilot 2) 
 
TE No NN Sigma-Pi EMRAN SHL 
Mean Roll x10e-1 3.0171 2.5672 1.0449 2.6877 
Mean Pitch x10e-4 -7.5015 -7.9599 1.3001 -9.6403 
Mean Yaw x10e-3 -116.20 -1.0067 -1.6330 -9.8127 
SD Roll  1.8405 1.7336 1.7007 1.7359 
SD Pitch x10e-3 9.7979 17.073 18.816 28.404 
SD Yaw x10e-3 7.2739 7.8356 8.9207 1.1077 
Table 5-8 Aileron Failure TE Statistics (Pilot 2) 
 
With Pilot 3 in the loop, a similar trend is observed for the stabilator failure. The 
contributions from all the three networks result in a decrease in TE, with EMRAN 
reducing it by 58% in pitch and 82% in roll. The statistics are given in Table 5-9 and 




Figure 5-8- Stabilator Failure TE with different NN (Pilot 3) 
 
TE No NN Sigma-Pi EMRAN SHL 
Mean Roll x10e0 -.6622 -.5030 -.1190 -.5570 
Mean Pitch x10e0 .2422 .1983 .1001 .2114 
Mean Yaw x10e-2 -5.2567 -4.4448 -4.9201 -4.4573 
SD Roll x10e0 2.4889 2.5544 2.5513 2.6015 
SD Pitch x10e0 1.0085 1.0678 1.0434 1.0599 
SD Yaw x10e-1 1.9158 2.0732 2.3196 2.0742 
Table 5-9 Stabilator Failure TE Statistics (Pilot 3) 
 
In the case of aileron failure, as shown in Figure 5-9, the TE performance is degraded for 
all the networks on the pitch channel. However, in the roll channel, the Sigma-Pi network 
reduces the mean TE by 6%, while the EMRAN significantly degrades the performance. 




Figure 5-9-Aileron Failure TE with different NN (Pilot 3) 
 
TE No NN Sigma-Pi EMRAN SHL 
Mean Roll x10e0 .3079 .2883 .8474 .3101 
Mean Pitch x10e0 -.66960 -2.3203 -1.6484 -5.2381 
Mean Yaw x10e-2 -1.2423 -1.4342 -2.0495 -1.1713 
SD Roll x10e0 1.8760 1.9125 1.8644 1.9196 
SD Pitch x10e0 1.2384 3.8596 1.2828 3.6064 
SD Yaw x10e-1 0.90192 1.1441 1.1084 1.1101 
Table 5-10- Aileron Failure TE Statistics (Pilot 3) 
 
With the conclusion of preliminary actuator failure tests in the simulator it was 
established that the MOTUS simulator served as a good test best for carrying out analysis 
of NN augmented control schemes. It extends the simulation capability to a next level of 
realism than the desktop simulation. Also, the motion and visual cues facilitate 
appropriate compensation in the advent of failure.  
 
The next step was to develop an adaptive failure detection scheme which is capable of 
detection and distinguishing an actuator failure from a sensor failure. The earlier work 
done on the integrated S/AFDIA scheme with constant thresholds is found to be 
susceptible to disturbances and the threshold is crossed from disturbances arising out of 
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stick input from pilot as well. The adaptive threshold scheme is extended for an 
integrated (sensor and actuator) FDII scheme and one broad objective of carrying out 
these piloted experiments was to evaluate the robustness of the adaptive FDII scheme 
which has substantial pilot activity. Normally in a desktop simulation there are fewer 
amounts of false alarms because of no pilot in the loop and as a result the scheme looks 
robust. In the advent of a pilot in the loop cross-correlations are induced even when there 
is no failure. Moreover, as soon as a failure is detected the pilot reacts and may result in 
perturbations of monitored signals and might lead to false isolations and detections. In a 
desktop simulation there is no such response and the scheme gives good results. In case 
of real flight this is not the case so the FDII scheme should be tolerant for pilot activity 
arising due to sudden failure and identify the failure correctly between the time of 
detection and identification. Moreover wrong identification may lead to a wrong 
reconfiguration of the controller and might perplex the pilot further. 
5.3. Evaluation of Integrated FDII Scheme with adaptive FL threshold 
As discussed in chapter 3, the FDII scheme developed for actuator and sensor failures 
were subjected to piloted experiments in the MFS. The pilot was instructed to maintain 
wings level flight and maintain an altitude within 200 ft and the failure was induced at   
30 sec from the start of simulation. Also the failures were thrown randomly so that pilot 
responds according to his best judgment without having a prior indication of the type of 
failure. The results are divided into two sections covering actuator and sensor failure 
cases. The FDII scheme result summary is expressed in terms of the detection delay, 
isolation delay, identification delay, correct isolation, correct identification and false 
alarms. The actuator failures are categorized as soft (2 deg), medium (5 deg) and hard           
(8 deg). The sensor failure have been formulated by having a small (4 deg/sec) and large      
(8 deg/sec) sensor bias. Also each of these biases is subject to a slow drift (2 sec), 
medium drift (6 sec) and fast drifts (10 sec). These six different cases of sensor failures 
shown in Figure 5-10  are used for the simulator tests. In order to reduce the number of 
experiments a test was carried out with an experienced pilot to choose the best NN for 
upcoming studies. An initial comparison of the Sigma-Pi and EMRAN was done based 
on simulating a hard stabilator failure (8 Deg) to choose among the two networks for the 
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next phase of the study. This was necessary to decrease the number of simulation tests. 
SHL was not used as its performance was poor in most of the earlier cases.  
Run-1 No NN Sigma-Pi EMRAN Sigma-Pi(% Inc/Dec) EMRAN(% Inc/Dec) 
Mean Roll -4.00E-01 -3.26E-01 -3.83E-02 18.49 90.41 
Mean Pitch 1.55E-01 1.29E-01 7.59E-02 16.54 51.01 
Mean Yaw -3.11E-02 -2.93E-02 -3.09E-02 5.56 0.53 
SD Roll 2.29E+00 2.22E+00 1.46E+00 3.27 36.39 
SD Pitch 9.04E-01 8.91E-01 7.83E-01 1.38 13.39 
SD Yaw 1.82E-01 1.74E-01 1.44E-01 4.17 20.94 
      
Run-2 No NN Sigma-Pi EMRAN Sigma-Pi(% Inc/Dec) EMRAN(% Inc/Dec) 
Mean Roll -4.29E-01 -6.17E-02 -3.03E-02 85.62 92.95 
Mean Pitch 1.61E-01 9.35E-02 8.51E-02 42.06 47.31 
Mean Yaw -3.38E-02 -3.39E-02 -3.12E-02 -0.45 7.68 
SD Roll 2.23E+00 1.96E+00 2.00E+00 12.37 10.29 
SD Pitch 8.96E-01 9.56E-01 9.83E-01 -6.67 -9.62 
SD Yaw 1.77E-01 1.78E-01 1.92E-01 -0.84 -8.64 
      
Run-3 No NN Sigma-Pi EMRAN Sigma-Pi(% Inc/Dec) EMRAN(% Inc/Dec) 
Mean Roll -3.64E-01 -3.50E-01 -3.50E-02 3.69 90.37 
Mean Pitch 1.38E-01 1.37E-01 8.10E-02 0.55 41.15 
Mean Yaw -2.80E-02 -2.99E-02 -2.97E-02 -6.89 -6.29 
SD Roll 2.22E+00 2.17E+00 1.94E+00 2.27 13.02 
SD Pitch 8.95E-01 9.12E-01 9.40E-01 -1.86 -5.04 
SD Yaw 1.77E-01 1.77E-01 1.69E-01 0.24 4.59 
Table 5-11 Comparison done for finalizing NN for further studies 
Based on these tests it can be seen that EMRAN has more improvement when compared 
with a no NN case and hence it was frozen to be used for next set of tests on the actuator 
failures. The sensors failures will be carried out for the EMRAN NN alone as the 
objective is to test the FDII scheme. The analysis of failure cases are done in terms of TE 
along the roll, pitch and yaw channels. It is an indication of controller to track desired 
inputs. The other parameter for analysis is the pilot compensation (PC) which is the sum 
of absolute stick activity over the time under consideration. In this analysis of FDII 
algorithms we have considered a time window of 20 sec for monitoring the PC 
immediately after failure. Since it is desirable to have a TE and PC as little as possible so 
the Composite Parameter (CP) denoted byη , which is the absolute of the product of TE 
and PC is the third parameter for a meaningful observation and desirable to be minimum 
for best performance. 
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Figure 5-10 Bias for Sensor Failures 
5.3.1. Analysis of Actuator Failure Cases (Stabilator Failure) 
Two locked types of failures (stabilator/aileron) were selected for conducting the FDII 
flight experiments in the flight simulator. The goal of this study was two folded. Firstly, 
to have a quantitative evaluation of pilot compensation in advent of a failure and 
secondly, to test the FL incorporated FDII scheme in the flight simulator. The study 
provided a means of testing the FDII scheme in a near realistic way in the flight 
simulator. Any pilot activity during the flight experiments induces cross-correlation rates 
and thus helped in evaluating the insensitivity of FDII to disturbances induced. In an 
ideal situation the FDII should be least effected by a pilot activity in failure warning 
systems. Since FDII scheme is built on monitoring cross-correlations rate which cannot 
be isolated when a pilot is in the loop. Any pilot activity is bound to induce coupling and 
thus FDII scheme is susceptible to wrong detection. The FL parameters are tuned 
appropriately to reduce the effect of pilot input. The actuator failure cases were repeated 





S.No  Failure  Cases Detection Isolation Identification T/F 
1 2 Deg Left Stab(NO NN) 30.1 31.16 30.22 T  
2 5 Deg Left Stab (NO NN) 30.08 30.1 30.2 T 
3 8 Deg Left Stab (NO NN) 30.06 30.08 30.16 F(Rudder) 
4 2 Deg Right Ail (NO NN) 30.14 30.2 30.24 T 
5 5 Deg Right Ail (NO NN) 30.1 30.24 30.26 T 
6 8 Deg Right Ail (NO NN) 30.08 30.1 30.16 T 
7 2 Deg Left Stab(EMRAN) 30.1 30.14 30.22 T 
8 5 Deg Left Stab (EMRAN) 30.08 30.1 30.2 T 
9 8 Deg Left Stab (EMRAN) 30.06 30.08 30.18 T 
10 2 Deg Right Ail (EMRAN) 30.12 30.34 30.36 T 
11 5 Deg Right Ail (EMRAN) 30.1 30.24 30.26 T 
12 8 Deg Right Ail (EMRAN) 30.18 30.24 30.26 T 
Table 5-12- Actuator Failure FDII results with Adaptive Threshold (Run1) 
S.No  Failure  Cases Detection Isolation Identification T/F 
1 2 Deg Left Stab(NO NN) 30.1 30.12 30.22 T 
2 5 Deg Left Stab (NO NN) 30.06 30.08 30.18 T 
3 8 Deg Left Stab (NO NN) 30.06 30.06 30.16 F(Rudder) 
4 2 Deg Right Ail (NO NN) 30.14 31.14 33.34 F(Pitch Sensor) 
5 5 Deg Right Ail (NO NN) 30.12 30.14 30.24 T 
6 8 Deg Right Ail (NO NN) 30.08 30.24 30.26 T 
7 2 Deg Left Stab(EMRAN) 30.1 30.12 30.22 T 
8 5 Deg Left Stab (EMRAN) 30.08 31.1 30.18 T 
9 8 Deg Left Stab (EMRAN) 30.06 30.08 30.18 T 
10 2 Deg Right Ail (EMRAN) 30.12 0.24 30.26 T 
11 5 Deg Right Ail (EMRAN) 30.1 30.2 30.22 T 
12 8 Deg Right Ail (EMRAN) 30.08 30.16 30.18 T 
Table 5-13- Actuator Failure FDII results with Adaptive Threshold (Run2) 
S.No  Failure  Cases Detection Isolation Identification T/F 
1 2 Deg Left Stab(NO NN) 30.1 30.14 30.22 T 
2 5 Deg Left Stab (NO NN) 30.08 30.1 30.2 T 
3 8 Deg Left Stab (NO NN) 30.06 30.08 30.18 T 
4 2 Deg Right Ail (NO NN) 30.14 31.14 33.34 F(Pitch Sensor) 
5 5 Deg Right Ail (NO NN) 30.12 30.28 30.3 T 
6 8 Deg Right Ail (NO NN) 30.08 30.24 30.26 T 
7 2 Deg Left Stab(EMRAN) 30.1 30.12 30.22 T 
8 5 Deg Left Stab (EMRAN) 30.08 30.1 30.2 T 
9 8 Deg Left Stab (EMRAN) 30.06 30.1 30.18 T 
10 2 Deg Right Ail (EMRAN) 30.12 30.2 30.22 T 
11 5 Deg Right Ail (EMRAN) 30.1 30.18 30.2 T 
12 8 Deg Right Ail (EMRAN) 30.08 30.16 30.18 T 
Table 5-14- Actuator Failure FDII results with Adaptive Threshold (Run3) 
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S.No  Failure  Cases Detection Isolation Identification T/F 
1 2 Deg Left Stab(NO NN) 30.1 30.14 30.22 T 
2 5 Deg Left Stab (NO NN) 30.08 30.1 30.2 T 
3 8 Deg Left Stab (NO NN) 30.06 30.08 30.18 T 
4 2 Deg Right Ail (NO NN) 30.12 30.28 30.3 T 
5 5 Deg Right Ail (NO NN) 30.1 30.2 30.22 T 
6 8 Deg Right Ail (NO NN) 30.08 30.18 30.2 T 
7 2 Deg Left Stab(EMRAN) 30.1 30.12 30.22 T 
8 5 Deg Left Stab (EMRAN) 30.08 30.1 30.2 T 
9 8 Deg Left Stab (EMRAN) 30.06 30.08 30.18 T 
10 2 Deg Right Ail (EMRAN)  30.18 30.26 30.28 T 
11 5 Deg Right Ail (EMRAN) 30.1 30.18 30.2 T 
12 8 Deg Right Ail (EMRAN) 30.08 30.16 30.18 T 
Table 5-15- Actuator Failure FDII results with Adaptive Threshold (Run4) 
S.No  Failure  Cases Detection Isolation Identification T/F 
1 2 Deg Left Stab(NO NN) Undetected Undetected  Undetected  NO DETECTION 
2 5 Deg Left Stab (NO NN) 30.08 30.1 30.2 T 
3 8 Deg Left Stab (NO NN) 30.06 30.1 30.18 T 
4 2 Deg Right Ail (NO NN) 30.14 30.28 30.3 T 
5 5 Deg Right Ail (NO NN) 30.1 30.22 30.24 T 
6 8 Deg Right Ail (NO NN) 30.08 30.16 30.18 T 
7 2 Deg Left Stab(EMRAN) 30.1 30.12 30.18 T 
8 5 Deg Left Stab (EMRAN) 30.08 30.1 30.2 T 
9 8 Deg Left Stab (EMRAN) 30.06 30.08 30.18 T 
10 2 Deg Right Ail (EMRAN) 30.12 30.24 30.26 T 
11 5 Deg Right Ail (EMRAN) 30.1 30.18 30.2 T 
12 8 Deg Right Ail (EMRAN) 30.08 30.16 30.18 T 
Table 5-16- Actuator Failure FDII results with Adaptive Threshold (Run5) 
As shown with Run 1 in Table 5-12, only one case is incorrectly identified. Two cases are 
incorrectly identified in Run2, one in Run 3, none in Run 4 and one case is undetected in 
Run 5. It should be noted that prior to running the piloted experiments, the FDII scheme 
was run on desktop without any pilot and there were no cases of false FDII. The pilot 
input in the experiments has triggered false alarms and detections in these cases. Table 














Stabilator failure 30 27 0 2 2 1 
Aileron failure 30 28 0 2 2 0 
Table 5-17-Summary of Piloted Tests of Adaptive FDII scheme for Actuator Failure  
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In the subsequent sections a performance evaluation of the FDII schemes is carried out in 
terms of Tracking Error (TE), amount of required pilot activity to accomplish the mission 
profile.  
5.3.1.1. Tracking Error Analysis of Stabilator Failures 
Tracking Error 2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
Statistics No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Mean Roll  -2.39E-01 -6.87E-02 -4.47E-01 -1.62E-01 -4.47E-01 -6.87E-02 
 Mean Pitch 9.07E-02 4.43E-02 1.80E-01 9.97E-02 3.06E-01 4.43E-02 
Mean Yaw -1.75E-02 -2.00E-02 -3.45E-02 -3.82E-02 -6.11E-02 -2.00E-02 
SD Roll 9.50E-01 8.03E-01 1.67E+00 1.63E+00 3.03E+00 8.03E-01 
SD Pitch 4.17E-01 3.38E-01 6.76E-01 6.70E-01 1.20E+00 3.38E-01 
SD Yaw 1.70E-01 1.68E-01 1.95E-01 2.06E-01 2.72E-01 1.68E-01 
Table 5-18- TE statistics for Left Stabilator (Run1) 
Tracking Error 2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
Statistics No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Mean Roll  -2.09E-01 -6.38E-02 -4.45E-01 -1.47E-01 -4.45E-01 -6.38E-02 
 Mean Pitch 9.37E-02 3.10E-02 2.04E-01 7.59E-02 3.53E-01 3.10E-02 
Mean Yaw -1.71E-02 -1.54E-02 -3.66E-02 -3.40E-02 -6.56E-02 -1.54E-02 
SD Roll 8.22E-01 7.97E-01 1.66E+00 1.68E+00 3.06E+00 7.97E-01 
SD Pitch 4.01E-01 3.23E-01 7.95E-01 6.70E-01 1.37E+00 3.23E-01 
SD Yaw 1.75E-01 1.70E-01 2.12E-01 2.11E-01 2.96E-01 1.70E-01 
Table 5-19- TE statistics for Left Stabilator (Run2) 
Tracking Error 2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
Statistics No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Mean Roll  -2.02E-01 -7.51E-02 -4.35E-01 -1.57E-01 -4.35E-01 -7.51E-02 
 Mean Pitch 9.12E-02 3.73E-02 1.93E-01 8.50E-02 4.13E-01 3.73E-02 
Mean Yaw -1.70E-02 -1.75E-02 -3.60E-02 -3.74E-02 -7.69E-02 -1.75E-02 
SD Roll 9.20E-01 7.89E-01 1.65E+00 1.69E+00 2.87E+00 7.89E-01 
SD Pitch 4.19E-01 3.16E-01 7.69E-01 6.82E-01 1.27E+00 3.16E-01 
SD Yaw 1.77E-01 1.70E-01 2.10E-01 2.13E-01 2.79E-01 1.70E-01 
Table 5-20- TE statistics for Left Stabilator (Run3) 
Tracking Error 2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
Statistics No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Mean Roll  -2.01E-01 -1.18E-01 -4.31E-01 -2.21E-01 -4.31E-01 -1.18E-01 
 Mean Pitch 8.13E-02 5.03E-02 1.75E-01 1.04E-01 3.22E-01 5.03E-02 
Mean Yaw -1.61E-02 -2.08E-02 -3.44E-02 -4.10E-02 -6.33E-02 -2.08E-02 
SD Roll 7.93E-01 7.73E-01 1.65E+00 1.61E+00 2.92E+00 7.73E-01 
SD Pitch 3.43E-01 3.13E-01 6.62E-01 6.40E-01 1.17E+00 3.13E-01 
SD Yaw 1.67E-01 1.69E-01 1.97E-01 2.06E-01 2.70E-01 1.69E-01 
Table 5-21- TE statistics for Left Stabilator (Run4) 
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Tracking Error 2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
Statistics No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Mean Roll  -8.69E-02 -9.09E-02 -4.90E-01 -1.96E-01 -4.90E-01 -9.09E-02 
 Mean Pitch 3.31E-02 4.04E-02 1.94E-01 9.58E-02 3.03E-01 4.04E-02 
Mean Yaw -6.99E-03 -1.76E-02 -3.79E-02 -3.91E-02 -6.04E-02 -1.76E-02 
SD Roll 3.54E-01 7.72E-01 1.51E+00 1.63E+00 3.16E+00 7.72E-01 
SD Pitch 1.78E-01 3.18E-01 6.02E-01 6.61E-01 1.26E+00 3.18E-01 
SD Yaw 1.58E-01 1.69E-01 1.91E-01 2.07E-01 2.87E-01 1.69E-01 




Fig. 5-11-TE for Left Stabilator soft failure (Run1) 
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Fig. 5-1 TE for Left Stabilator Medium failure (Run1) 
 
Fig. 5-2 TE for Left Stabilator hard failure (Run1) 
 
The stabilator failure induces a coupling in roll and pitch with little effect on yaw 
channel. Since the pilot was instructed for a same mission profile therefore the TE results 
can be averaged for the 5 runs for any meaningful conclusion. These are tabulated in 
Table 5-23 for the soft, medium and hard failure. As can be seen for a soft failure (2deg), 
the mean of TE along pitch channel for EMRAN NN is 48% lower than for a no NN 
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case. For the pitch channel it is a 56% lesser than a no NN case. Along the yaw channel 
there is however increases of 22% in the TE compared to a no NN case .Similarly, in case 
of the medium stabilator failure (5 deg), the mean of TE shows a decrease of 52% along 
pitch and 61% along roll channel. The yaw TE increase with EMRAN compared to no 
NN case. For a hard failure (8 deg), however the mean of TE along pitch, roll and yaw 
channel shows a decrease of 88%, 81% and 72% respectively from a no NN case. 
Tracking Error 2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
Statistics No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Mean Roll  -1.88E-01 -8.33E-02 -4.50E-01 -1.77E-01 -4.50E-01 -8.33E-02 
 Mean Pitch 7.80E-02 4.06E-02 1.89E-01 9.22E-02 3.40E-01 4.06E-02 
Mean Yaw -1.49E-02 -1.83E-02 -3.59E-02 -3.80E-02 -6.54E-02 -1.83E-02 
SD Roll 7.68E-01 7.87E-01 1.63E+00 1.65E+00 3.01E+00 7.87E-01 
SD Pitch 3.52E-01 3.22E-01 7.01E-01 6.65E-01 1.25E+00 3.22E-01 
SD Yaw 1.69E-01 1.69E-01 2.01E-01 2.09E-01 2.81E-01 1.69E-01 
Table 5-23- Average of 5 runs for Stabilator failure 
 
5.3.1.2. Pilot Activity Analysis 
 
Fig 5-12-Pilot Activity for Left Stabilator Failure (Run1) 
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Figure 5-13 Pilot Activity for Medium Stabilator Failure (Run1) 
 
Fig. 5-14-Pilot Activity for Hard Stabilator Failure (Run1) 
 
  2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
Stick Activity No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Lateral  1.9914 0.4921 0.9489 0.3878 2.9470 3.0497 
Longitudinal 1.9737 0.1797 0.9776 0.9531 2.0409 1.6669 
Directional 0.0000 0.4323 0.0000 0.0000 2.7738 0.0000 
Table 5-24- Pilot Activity for Left Stabilator Failure (Run 1) 
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  2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
Stick Activity No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Lateral  1.2450 0.9914 0.1850 1.8606 5.8352 1.9231 
Longitudinal 1.2853 0.8282 1.4829 0.7906 3.6638 0.4619 
Directional 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 5-25- Pilot Activity for Left Stabilator Failure (Run 2) 
 
  2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
Stick Activity No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Lateral  1.3565 1.3148 1.5163 2.6622 4.1735 2.8421 
Longitudinal 0.0798 0.1480 1.4335 1.3242 1.4388 2.0285 
Directional 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 5-26- Pilot Activity for Left Stabilator Failure (Run 3) 
 
 2 deg 5 deg 8 deg 
Stick Activity No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Lateral  1.0702 1.1366 2.3505 0.5165 3.8280 1.6925 
Longitudinal 0.8165 0.4364 0.9862 0.3965 1.3527 0.7399 
Directional 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 5-27- Pilot Activity for Left Stabilator Failure (Run 4) 
 
  2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
Stick Activity No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Lateral  0.6453 0.1718 1.5008 1.3012 4.6993 3.5295 
Longitudinal 0.0000 0.5405 0.6548 1.2617 2.7355 1.2537 
Directional 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 5-28- Pilot Activity for Left Stabilator Failure (Run 5) 
 
The average pilot activity for 5 runs of the stabilator failure is shown in Table 5-29. The 
main effect of this type of failure is on the pitch and roll channel. It can be seen that for a 
soft failure EMRAN has 48% lower pilot activity in longitudinal channel than a no NN 
case. Similarly, it is 34% lower in lateral channel. For a medium failure, EMRAN shows 
a decrease in 14% compared to a No NN while mean TE increases along lateral channel 
by 3%. Similarly, for hard failure there is a reduction in pilot activity for EMRAN in 
comparison to a no NN case. It is 45% lower for longitudinal and 39% lower for lateral. 
In general there is a trend of reduced pilot activity and it was corroborated by pilot 
feedback as well. The pilot experienced a reduced workload with EMRAN NN. Yaw 
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channel pilot activity however is very minimal and cannot be concluded for any 
meaningful observation. 
 
  2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
Stick Activity No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Lateral  1.2617 0.8213 1.3003 1.3457 4.2966 2.6074 
Longitudinal 0.8311 0.4265 1.1070 0.9452 2.2463 1.2302 
Directional 0.0000 0.0865 0.0000 0.0000 0.5548 0.0000 
Table 5-29 Average Pilot Activity for Stabilator Failure 
 
Since the objective of design of the controller required a minimal amount of TE together 
with a little stick activity on behalf of the pilot in advent of failures. So a composite 
parameter (CP) denoted as η is an appropriate indication of the performance index of the 
schemes which is the product of the TE and the PC and is shown below. 
 
TE PCη = ×  
 
The CP for stabilator failures is shown in Table 5-30 for the soft, medium and hard 
failure. The CP has shown a remarkable reduction for an EMRAN augmented scheme 
than a No NN scheme. For example if we look at Run 1, EMRAN shows a reduction in  
η  for the roll and pitch channels. The composite parameter η  reduced by 86% along roll 
and 80% along pitch channel for the soft failure. EMRAN reduced η  by 74% and 45% in 
roll and pitch channel for a medium failure. Similarly, for the hard failure EMRAN have 
reduced the η  by 84% and 87% respectively along the roll and pitch channel. It is also 
observed that there is no appreciable improvement along the yaw channel for the soft and 








Composite Parameter (Stabilator)- Run1 
  2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
CP  No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Roll  0.7161 0.1025 0.8709 0.2250 1.7639 0.2783 
Pitch 0.2696 0.0522 0.3552 0.1948 0.9313 0.1181 
Yaw 0.0175 0.0286 0.0345 0.0382 0.2307 0.0200 
Composite Parameter (Stabilator)- Run2 
 CP  No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Roll  0.4699 0.1271 0.5271 0.4193 3.0404 0.1865 
Pitch 0.2140 0.0566 0.5058 0.1360 1.6473 0.0453 
Yaw 0.0171 0.0154 0.0366 0.0340 0.0656 0.0154 
Composite Parameter (Stabilator)- Run3 
  2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
CP   No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Roll  0.4750 0.1738 1.0941 0.5766 2.2495 0.2884 
Pitch 0.0985 0.0428 0.4699 0.1975 1.0077 0.1128 
Yaw 0.0170 0.0175 0.0360 0.0374 0.0769 0.0175 
Composite Parameter (Stabilator)- Run4 
  2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
CP   No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Roll  0.4162 0.2524 1.4450 0.3355 2.0822 0.3180 
Pitch 0.1476 0.0723 0.3471 0.1458 0.7580 0.0875 
Yaw 0.0161 0.0208 0.0344 0.0410 0.0633 0.0208 
Composite Parameter (Stabilator)- Run5 
  2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
 CP  No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Roll  0.1430 0.1065 1.2260 0.4499 2.7941 0.4118 
Pitch 0.0331 0.0622 0.3214 0.2166 1.1308 0.0910 
Yaw 0.0070 0.0176 0.0379 0.0391 0.0604 0.0176 
Table 5-30 Composite Parameter for Stabilator Failure 
 
A lower value of η  is desirable and is also demonstrated from the CP values of the 
stabilator failure results. An average of all the tests is tabulated in Table 5-31 and it can 
be concluded that there is a reduction in CP with EMRAN augmentation in all cases 
along the roll and pitch channel. There is a reduction of 64%, 59% and 87% along the roll 
channel for soft, medium and hard failure respectively. Similarly these values are 59%, 
54% and 91% along the pitch channel. For the yaw channel there is an increase in CP 
i.e.32% and 6% for soft and medium failure respectively. For the hard failure EMRAN 
reduces it by 82%. 
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From the analysis of the CP it can be concluded that EMRAN has improved the perform 
ace consistently and η  is an indication of reduced pilot workload in the advent of a 
failure. For hard failures which require more pilot effort to compensate and maintain a 
level flight EMRAN had reduced the pilot workload considerably. 
 
 2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
 CP  No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Roll  0.4244 0.1518 1.0342 0.4142 2.3814 0.3006 
Pitch 0.1428 0.0580 0.3984 0.1793 1.1022 0.0906 
Yaw 0.0149 0.0198 0.0359 0.0380 0.1018 0.0183 
Table 5-31 Average CP for Stabilator Failure Cases 
5.3.1.3. FDII Analysis of Stabilator Failures 
The MQEE is the main parameter responsible for detection of actuator failure and it rises 
fast as compared to OQEE. Figure 5-15 shows the MQEE crossing the soft failure UB 
immediately after the failure. However, the hard UB is still not crossed. In case of 
medium and hard failures as shown in Fig. 5-16 and Fig. 5-17 the hard UB is crossed and 
thus a failure detection flag is triggered. The floating bounds on OQEE are however not 
reached to trigger any detection flag.   
  







Fig. 5-16- Medium Failure Detection with FL Hard Bound for Stabilator using MQEE 
  
Fig. 5-17- Hard Failure Detection with FL Hard Bound for Stabilator using MQEE 
  




Fig. 5-19- No Detection with OQEE for Medium Stabilator Failure 
  
Fig. 5-20- Detection with OQEE for Hard Stabilator Failure 
  


























5.3.2. Analysis of Actuator Failure Cases (Aileron Failure) 
5.3.2.1. Tracking Error Analysis 
 
Fig. 5-27- TE for a Soft Aileron failure (Run1) 
 
Fig. 5-28- TE for a Medium Aileron failure (Run1) 
 79 
 
Fig. 5-29- TE for a Hard Aileron failure (Run1) 
 
Tracking Error 2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
Statistics No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Mean Roll  1.74E-01 4.95E-02 2.66E-01 7.57E-02 2.66E-01 4.95E-02 
 Mean Pitch 6.29E-05 -1.49E-03 -1.16E-03 -1.82E-03 -3.71E-03 -1.49E-03 
Mean Yaw -6.10E-04 -3.43E-04 -9.82E-04 -1.70E-03 -1.80E-03 -3.43E-04 
SD Roll 8.53E-01 8.19E-01 1.41E+00 1.37E+00 2.07E+00 8.19E-01 
SD Pitch 1.43E-01 1.44E-01 1.43E-01 1.44E-01 1.48E-01 1.44E-01 
SD Yaw 1.52E-01 1.53E-01 1.52E-01 1.53E-01 1.54E-01 1.53E-01 
Table 5-32-TE statistics for aileron failure (Run 1) 
 
Tracking Error 2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
Statistics No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Mean Roll  1.24E-01 4.68E-02 2.02E-01 1.90E-01 2.02E-01 4.68E-02 
 Mean Pitch 2.50E-04 -1.90E-03 4.79E-03 -2.64E-03 -7.11E-04 -1.90E-03 
Mean Yaw -4.56E-04 -1.02E-03 -6.82E-04 -2.37E-03 -9.01E-04 -1.02E-03 
SD Roll 7.06E-01 8.18E-01 1.14E+00 2.10E+00 1.79E+00 8.18E-01 
SD Pitch 1.48E-01 1.47E-01 1.52E-01 1.47E-01 1.48E-01 1.47E-01 
SD Yaw 1.58E-01 1.55E-01 1.58E-01 1.55E-01 1.58E-01 1.55E-01 





Tracking Error 2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
Statistics No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Mean Roll  1.23E-01 6.50E-02 2.01E-01 1.09E-01 2.01E-01 6.50E-02 
 Mean Pitch 2.81E-03 -3.62E-03 8.07E-04 -2.15E-03 -3.76E-04 -3.62E-03 
Mean Yaw -4.37E-04 -5.98E-04 -6.54E-04 -1.40E-03 -6.97E-04 -5.98E-04 
SD Roll 7.09E-01 8.10E-01 1.13E+00 1.33E+00 1.79E+00 8.10E-01 
SD Pitch 1.48E-01 1.47E-01 1.48E-01 1.47E-01 1.48E-01 1.47E-01 
SD Yaw 1.59E-01 1.55E-01 1.58E-01 1.55E-01 1.58E-01 1.55E-01 
Table 5-34-TE statistics for aileron failure (Run3) 
 
Tracking Error 2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
Statistics No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Mean Roll  1.51E-01 3.28E-02 2.55E-01 9.64E-02 2.55E-01 3.28E-02 
 Mean Pitch -2.56E-03 -5.25E-03 -2.29E-03 -2.08E-03 -3.42E-03 -5.25E-03 
Mean Yaw -3.87E-04 -2.53E-04 -1.17E-03 -1.33E-03 -1.69E-03 -2.53E-04 
SD Roll 8.17E-01 5.78E-01 1.34E+00 1.33E+00 1.99E+00 5.78E-01 
SD Pitch 1.47E-01 1.47E-01 1.46E-01 1.47E-01 1.49E-01 1.47E-01 
SD Yaw 1.54E-01 1.55E-01 1.54E-01 1.55E-01 1.56E-01 1.55E-01 
Table 5-35-TE statistics for aileron failure (Run4) 
 
Tracking Error 2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
Statistics No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Mean Roll  1.54E-01 6.53E-02 2.60E-01 1.15E-01 2.60E-01 6.53E-02 
 Mean Pitch -2.44E-03 -2.02E-03 -3.06E-03 -2.22E-03 -4.64E-03 -2.02E-03 
Mean Yaw -6.58E-04 -5.12E-04 -1.11E-03 -1.43E-03 -1.95E-03 -5.12E-04 
SD Roll 8.20E-01 8.06E-01 1.34E+00 1.32E+00 2.03E+00 8.06E-01 
SD Pitch 1.46E-01 1.47E-01 1.46E-01 1.47E-01 1.49E-01 1.47E-01 
SD Yaw 1.54E-01 1.55E-01 1.54E-01 1.55E-01 1.55E-01 1.55E-01 
Table 5-36-TE statistics for aileron failure (Run5) 
The average of 5 runs for the aileron failure is shown in Table 5-37 . For a soft failure, 
the mean roll TE for EMRAN is 64% lower than no NN case. For a medium failure it is 
51% lower and for a hard failure it is 78% lower than No NN. The mean TE along pitch 
channel increase with EMRAN for the soft, medium and hard failures.  
Tracking Error 2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
Statistics No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Mean Roll  1.45E-01 5.19E-02 2.37E-01 1.17E-01 2.37E-01 5.19E-02 
 Mean Pitch -3.75E-04 -2.85E-03 -1.80E-04 -2.18E-03 -2.57E-03 -2.85E-03 
Mean Yaw -5.10E-04 -5.46E-04 -9.19E-04 -1.64E-03 -1.41E-03 -5.46E-04 
SD Roll 7.81E-01 7.66E-01 1.27E+00 1.49E+00 1.94E+00 7.66E-01 
SD Pitch 1.46E-01 1.46E-01 1.47E-01 1.46E-01 1.49E-01 1.46E-01 
SD Yaw 1.55E-01 1.55E-01 1.55E-01 1.55E-01 1.56E-01 1.55E-01 
Table 5-37-Average of 5 Runs for Aileron Failure 
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5.3.2.2. Stick Activity Analysis 
The stick activity for 20 seconds after the failure is shown in Table 5-38- Table 5-42. As 
can be seen from Table 5-38 , EMRAN has reduced pilot activity for pitch channel. 
 
 
Figure 5-30 Pilot Activity for Soft Aileron Failure (Run 1) 
 
 
Figure 5-31 Pilot Activity for Medium Aileron Failure (Run 1) 
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Figure 5-32  Pilot Activity for Hard Aileron Failure (Run 1) 
 
  2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
Stick Activity No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Lateral  0.24669 0.26045 0 0.85622 1.1329 0.8816 
Longitudinal 0.17477 0.0066015 1.0182 0.741 0.43793 0.66156 
Directional 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 5-38- Pilot Activity for Right Aileron Failure (Run 1) 
 
  2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
 Activity  No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Lateral  0 0 1.0384 0 0 1.7698 
Longitudinal 0 0.74725 0.1053 0.31267 0.13645 0.30788 
Directional 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 5-39- Pilot Activity for Right Aileron Failure (Run 2) 
  2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
Stick Activity  No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Lateral  0.34459 1.34 0 0 0 0.31442 
Longitudinal 0 0.071806 0.69882 0.3789 0.5996 0.70339 
Directional 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 5-40- Pilot Activity for Right Aileron Failure (Run 3) 
 
 2 deg 5 deg 8 deg 
Stick Activity No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Lateral  0.0089399 0.049124 0.050194 0 0.84842 0 
Longitudinal 0.57014 0.62955 0.49721 0.50048 0.35209 0.78907 
Directional 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 5-41- Pilot Activity for Right Aileron Failure (Run 4) 
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  2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
Stick Activity No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Lateral  0.067996 0 0.3772 0 1.0083 0.20597 
Longitudinal 0.68904 0.033492 0.19058 0.21471 0.77237 0.51599 
Directional 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 5-42- Pilot Activity for Right Aileron Failure (Run 5) 
Considering the average pilot activity for the aileron failures as shown in Table 5-43, it 
can be seen that pilot activity is comparable for No NN and EMRAN in longitudinal 
channel. As a general trend EMRAN needs more pilot workload in roll channel. No pilot 
activity is in required in the yaw channel for aileron failure cases. 
 
  2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
 Stick Activity No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Lateral  0.1336432 0.3299148 0.2931588 0.171244 0.597924 0.634358 
Longitudinal 0.28679 0.2977399 0.502022 0.429552 0.459688 0.595578 
Directional 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 5-43 Average Pilot Activity for Aileron Failure Cases 
 
In a similar way as stabilator failure cases the CP is evaluated for the aileron failures and 
is shown in Table 5-44. The roll channel is predominant in aileron failures and much of 
the pilot activity is in this channel for maintaining the mission profile. The EMRAN 
augmentations have shown a definite trend of reducing the η compared to the No NN 
case. For example if we consider Run 1, there is a reduction of 71% for a soft failure, 
47% for a medium failure and 83% for a hard failure along the roll channel. The similar 
trend is for the rest of the failures.  An interesting observation is that the reduction is 
highest for a hard failure except Run2 and it gives a clear indication that EMRAN have 
helped the pilot in dealing with the failure better than when there is No NN. This was also 
subjectively corroborated by the feedback from the pilot while the experiments were 
being conducted. Thus CP is an important parameter in analysis of NN performance 








  2 deg  5 deg 8 deg 
CP  No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Roll  0.2167 0.0623 0.2663 0.1404 0.5679 0.0931 
Pitch 0.0001 0.0015 0.0023 0.0032 0.0053 0.0025 
Yaw 0.0006 0.0003 0.0010 0.0017 0.0018 0.0003 
Run2 
Roll  0.1240 0.0468 0.4124 0.1899 0.2023 0.1297 
Pitch 0.0003 0.0033 0.0053 0.0035 0.0008 0.0025 
Yaw 0.0005 0.0010 0.0007 0.0024 0.0009 0.0010 
Run3 
  No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Roll  0.1658 0.1522 0.2007 0.1093 0.2007 0.0855 
Pitch 0.0028 0.0039 0.0014 0.0030 0.0006 0.0062 
Yaw 0.0004 0.0006 0.0007 0.0014 0.0007 0.0006 
Run4 
  No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Roll  0.1519 0.0344 0.2683 0.0964 0.4722 0.0328 
Pitch 0.0040 0.0086 0.0034 0.0031 0.0046 0.0094 
Yaw 0.0004 0.0003 0.0012 0.0013 0.0017 0.0003 
Run5 
  No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Roll  0.1642 0.0653 0.3585 0.1147 0.5228 0.0788 
Pitch 0.0041 0.0021 0.0036 0.0027 0.0082 0.0031 
Yaw 0.0007 0.0005 0.0011 0.0014 0.0019 0.0005 
Table 5-44 Composite Parameter for Aileron Failures 
 
 2 deg 5 deg 8 deg 
CP No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN No NN EMRAN 
Roll 0.1645 0.0690 0.3065 0.1373 0.3787 0.0848 
Pitch 0.0005 0.0037 0.0003 0.0031 0.0038 0.0046 
Yaw 0.0005 0.0005 0.0009 0.0016 0.0014 0.0005 
Table 5-45 Average Composite Parameter for Aileron Failures 
Considering the average of the CP in Table 5-45 for all the 5 runs of the aileron failures, 
there is a reduction of η along roll channel by 58%, 55% and 77% respectively for a soft, 
medium and hard failure. Along the pitch channel, EMRAN have increased η for the soft, 
medium and hard failure though this increase is minimal for hard failure. For the yaw 
channel EMRAN shows an increase for soft and medium failure but a reverse trend for 
hard failure. It can be concluded that EMRAN greatest contribution is during hard 
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failures when pilot compensation is not sufficient to maintain the mission profile in a 
minimum time. 
5.3.2.3. FDII Analysis of Aileron Failures 
 
  
Figure 5-33- Detection of a soft aileron failure 
 
  




Figure  5-35- Detection of a soft aileron failure 
 
Isolation of Aileron failure 
  
Figure  5-36- Isolation of a soft Aileron Failure  
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Figure 5-37- Isolation of a Medium Aileron Failure 
  
Figure  5-38- Isolation of a Hard Aileron Failure 
Identification of Aileron failure 
  









Figure 5-41- Identification of Hard Aileron Failure with
pq
ω  
5.3.3. Analysis of Sensor Failure Cases (Roll Sensor) 
5.3.3.1. Tracking Error Analysis 
The TE statistics for roll sensor failures for the 5 runs are tabulated below in Table 5-46. 
Roll Sensor -Run1 
  SF #1 SF #2 SF #3 SF #4 SF #5 SF #6 
Mean Roll 1.4544E-04 -1.7799E-02 -1.6920E-02 -1.5761E-02 -8.5170E-04 -1.6501E-02 
Mean Pitch -1.9340E-03 -1.8064E-03 -1.8212E-03 -1.7971E-03 -1.8371E-03 -1.7666E-03 
Mean Yaw 9.8992E-04 7.6659E-04 7.8719E-04 9.4406E-04 6.0538E-04 8.8158E-04 
SD Roll 3.7190E-01 6.7338E-01 3.7344E-01 3.9960E-01 5.1856E-01 3.9903E-01 
SD Pitch 1.4654E-01 1.4662E-01 1.4648E-01 1.4643E-01 1.4646E-01 1.4643E-01 
SD Yaw 1.5566E-01 1.5574E-01 1.5574E-01 1.5562E-01 1.5565E-01 1.5565E-01 
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Roll Sensor -Run2 
Mean Roll -1.3981E-02 -8.4069E-03 -8.0537E-03 -2.0159E-02 -1.3002E-02 -1.6081E-02 
Mean Pitch -1.8307E-03 -1.9189E-03 -2.0157E-03 -1.9060E-03 -1.9783E-03 -1.8779E-03 
Mean Yaw 9.7828E-04 4.8118E-04 7.2537E-04 8.9779E-04 8.8327E-04 9.0807E-04 
SD Roll 6.4619E-01 5.8936E-01 6.8990E-01 4.3785E-01 4.1023E-01 3.3896E-01 
SD Pitch 1.4649E-01 1.4654E-01 1.4724E-01 1.4646E-01 1.4642E-01 1.4642E-01 
SD Yaw 1.5569E-01 1.5580E-01 1.5618E-01 1.5569E-01 1.5568E-01 1.5563E-01 
Roll Sensor -Run3 
Mean Roll -1.1165E-02 -1.4222E-02 -1.8597E-02 -2.2246E-02 -1.7915E-02 -7.3550E-03 
Mean Pitch -1.8173E-03 -1.7986E-03 -1.8074E-03 -1.8008E-03 -1.7877E-03 -1.9331E-03 
Mean Yaw 9.5335E-04 9.7666E-04 7.2640E-04 7.7909E-04 7.4074E-04 5.2124E-04 
SD Roll 3.8061E-01 4.2633E-01 4.4934E-01 4.5874E-01 4.5161E-01 4.5668E-01 
SD Pitch 1.4644E-01 1.4650E-01 1.4645E-01 1.4643E-01 1.4644E-01 1.4639E-01 
SD Yaw 1.5561E-01 1.5562E-01 1.5574E-01 1.5569E-01 1.5569E-01 1.5570E-01 
Roll Sensor -Run4 
Mean Roll -2.6271E-02 -5.4341E-03 -1.6300E-02 -1.7626E-02 -2.1366E-02 -7.7890E-03 
Mean Pitch -1.8490E-03 -1.9416E-03 -1.8343E-03 -1.8264E-03 -1.8745E-03 -1.9378E-03 
Mean Yaw 8.1100E-04 6.8564E-04 8.3262E-04 7.3165E-04 7.5095E-04 7.9093E-04 
SD Roll 4.2492E-01 5.1931E-01 4.8534E-01 5.6613E-01 4.7266E-01 4.1448E-01 
SD Pitch 1.4645E-01 1.4655E-01 1.4642E-01 1.4644E-01 1.4641E-01 1.4642E-01 
SD Yaw 1.5571E-01 1.5566E-01 1.5570E-01 1.5584E-01 1.5587E-01 1.5569E-01 
Roll Sensor -Run5 
Mean Roll -1.5021E-02 -1.7392E-02 -1.3256E-02 -1.2203E-02 3.3891E-03 -1.0074E-02 
Mean Pitch -1.7812E-03 -1.9111E-03 -1.8888E-03 -1.8888E-03 -1.8584E-03 -1.7533E-03 
Mean Yaw 6.6255E-04 7.6744E-04 7.1986E-04 7.4291E-04 4.4932E-04 6.9476E-04 
SD Roll 4.0513E-01 3.4697E-01 4.7920E-01 4.1507E-01 4.4880E-01 5.3449E-01 
SD Pitch 1.4645E-01 1.4653E-01 1.4642E-01 1.4643E-01 1.4644E-01 1.4645E-01 
SD Yaw 1.5564E-01 1.5566E-01 1.5567E-01 1.5561E-01 1.5565E-01 1.5570E-01 
Table 5-46 Tracking Error (TE) statistics for Roll Sensor Failures 
 
5.3.3.2. Stick Activity Roll Sensor Failures 
 
Run1 
Stick Activity SF #1 SF #2 SF #3 SF #4 SF #5 SF #6 
Lateral  0.9125 1.0010 0.9839 0.8945 0.9125 0.9219 
Longitudinal 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Directional 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Run2 
Lateral  1.0770 0.9013 0.9307 0.9527 1.0770 0.9674 
Longitudinal 0.0000 0.0000 0.2348 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Directional 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Run3 
Lateral  1.0781 1.1434 0.8290 1.0004 1.0781 0.7446 
Longitudinal 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Directional 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Run4 
Lateral  1.0629 0.8617 0.8185 0.7821 1.0629 0.9983 
Longitudinal 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Directional 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Run5 
Lateral  1.0358 0.8168 0.8349 0.8185 1.0358 1.0075 
Longitudinal 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Directional 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 5-47 Stick Activity for Roll Sensor Failures 
Considering the average of stick activity for the roll sensor failures, there is little or no 
activity along the pitch and yaw channels. The pilot compensation is of the same order in 
all the test cases. Clearly, there is no significant workload on the pilot on the onset of 
failures however; this small activity is because of the instrument readings in the cockpit. 
The sensor failure induces a small shift in the horizon indicator and pilot thinks that it is a 
failure. There is no motion cue for the pilot in case of sensor failures but the visual cue 
change at the onset of sensor failure. In order to bring the instrument reading to level 
pilot does a little activity which is typically the stick activity shown in tables.  
 
Stick Activity SF #1 SF #2 SF #3 SF #4 SF #5 SF #6 
Lateral  1.0333 0.9448 0.8794 0.8896 1.0333 0.9279 
Longitudinal 0.0000 0.0000 0.0470 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Directional 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 5-48 Average Stick Activity for Roll Sensor Failures 
5.3.3.3. FDII Analysis of Roll Sensor Failures 
The piloted tests in the flight simulator were performed for a roll sensor failure and Table 
5-49- Table 5-53 shows the FDII results in terms of detection time, isolation time and 
identification time. The FDII has shown to detect, isolate and identify the roll sensor 





S.No  Failure  Cases Detection Isolation Identification T/F 
1 Roll Sensor SFDB 31.92 32.92 33.98 T 
2 Roll Sensor LFDB 31.3 31.3 36.3 T 
3 Roll Sensor SMDB 30.38 31.38 31.92 T 
4 Roll Sensor LMDB 31.88   32.88 33.98  T 
5 Roll Sensor SSDB 30.38 31.38 31.92 T 
6 Roll Sensor LSDB 31.88 32.38 33.98 T 
Table 5-49 FDII results for Roll Sensor Failure (Run1) 
S.No  Failure  Cases Detection Isolation Identification T/F 
1 Roll Sensor SFDB 31.92 32.92 33.98 T 
2 Roll Sensor LFDB 31.3 32.3 33.9 T 
3 Roll Sensor SMDB 30.38 31.38 31.92 T 
4 Roll Sensor LMDB 31.9 32.92 33.98 T 
5 Roll Sensor SSDB 30.38 31.38 31.90 T 
6 Roll Sensor LSDB 30.38 31.38 31.92 T 
Table 5-50 FDII results for Roll Sensor Failure (Run2) 
S.No  Failure  Cases Detection Isolation Identification T/F 
1 Roll Sensor SFDB 31.92 32.92 33.98 T 
2 Roll Sensor LFDB 31.3 32.3 45.26 T 
3 Roll Sensor SMDB 30.38 31.38 31.92 T 
4 Roll Sensor LMDB 31.9 32.92 33.98 T 
5 Roll Sensor SSDB 30.38 31.38 31.92 T 
6 Roll Sensor LSDB 31.88 32.88 33.98 T 
Table 5-51 FDII results for Roll Sensor Failure (Run3) 
S.No  Failure  Cases Detection Isolation Identification T/F 
1 Roll Sensor SFDB 31.92 32.92 33.98 T 
2 Roll Sensor LFDB 31.3 32.3 33.82 T 
3 Roll Sensor SMDB 30.38 31.38 31.92 T 
4 Roll Sensor LMDB 31.9 32.92 33.98 T 
5 Roll Sensor SSDB 30.38 31.38 31.92 T 
6 Roll Sensor LSDB 31.88 32.88 33.98 T 
Table 5-52 FDII results for Roll Sensor Failure (Run4) 
S.No  Failure  Cases Detection Isolation Identification T/F 
1 Roll Sensor SFDB 31.92 32.92 33.98 T 
2 Roll Sensor LFDB 31.3 32.3 33.82 T 
3 Roll Sensor SMDB 30.38 31.38 31.92 T 
4 Roll Sensor LMDB 31.9 32.92 33.98 T 
5 Roll Sensor SSDB 30.38 31.38 31.92 T 
6 Roll Sensor LSDB 31.08 32.88 33.96 T 
Table 5-53 FDII results for Roll Sensor Failure (Run5) 
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The detection phase consists of monitoring MQEE and OQEE . It can be seen from   
Figure 5-42 that there is no detection with MQEE because of its low sensitivity to sensor 
failures. On the other hand OQEE  detects the roll sensor failure for all the six different 
cases and is shown in Figure 5-43. A roll sensor failure is identified in all the test cases. 
 





Figure 5-43- OQEE for Detection (Plots Zoomed to show detections) 
pq
R is used for isolation of failure and due to its slow rise for roll sensor failure,
pq
R  
doesn’t cross the _pq floatingR bounds. Considering the time 1t∆  after detection of the failure 
for 
pq
R  to build up, the sensor failure is isolated. Once the sensor failure is isolated the 
identification logic monitors the DQEE parameters along roll, pitch and yaw channels. 
Figure 5-46-Figure 5-50 shows DQEE along the three channels for the six different cases 




Figure 5-44- No crossing of Bounds with Rpq isolates sensor failure 
 
Figure 5-45- Identification of Roll Sensor for SFDB (SF #1) 
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Figure 5-46- Identification of Roll Sensor for LFDB (SF #2) 
 
 




Figure 5-48- Identification of Roll Sensor for LMDB (SF #4) 
 
Figure 5-49- Identification of Roll Sensor for SSDB (SF #5) 
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Figure 5-50- Identification of Roll Sensor for LSDB (SF #6) 
5.3.4. Analysis of Sensor Failure Cases (Pitch Sensor)  
5.3.4.1. Tracking Error Analysis 
 
Pitch Sensor -Run1 
  SF #1 SF #2 SF #3 SF #4 SF #5 SF #6 
Mean Roll 9.0036E-05 6.0896E-04 4.2043E-05 9.6828E-06 -4.3943E-04 -2.1842E-04 
Mean Pitch -2.1606E-03 -6.2095E-03 -1.9742E-03 -3.1508E-03 3.5100E-04 -3.6489E-04 
Mean Yaw 4.8937E-04 5.5042E-04 4.8006E-04 4.7660E-04 4.4197E-04 4.5988E-04 
SD Roll 2.0407E-01 2.0428E-01 2.0402E-01 2.0408E-01 2.0414E-01 2.0403E-01 
SD Pitch 1.8509E-01 5.2300E-01 1.3444E-01 1.5942E-01 1.2817E-01 1.3937E-01 
SD Yaw 1.5570E-01 1.5575E-01 1.5570E-01 1.5570E-01 1.5570E-01 1.5570E-01 
 
Pitch Sensor -Run2 
Mean Roll -8.7510E-06 5.5668E-04 -1.4299E-04 -2.5965E-04 5.5726E-05 3.4254E-04 
Mean Pitch -1.9799E-03 -4.6385E-03 -7.0681E-04 -7.8591E-04 -1.9935E-03 -5.9891E-03 
Mean Yaw 4.7653E-04 5.3986E-04 4.6484E-04 4.5812E-04 4.8126E-04 4.9809E-04 
SD Roll 2.0410E-01 2.0478E-01 2.0414E-01 2.0409E-01 2.0400E-01 2.0415E-01 
SD Pitch 1.8460E-01 4.3062E-01 1.3464E-01 1.5857E-01 1.2678E-01 1.4158E-01 
SD Yaw 1.5571E-01 1.5578E-01 1.5570E-01 1.5570E-01 1.5570E-01 1.5570E-01 
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Pitch Sensor -Run3 
Mean Roll 1.0105E-04 4.4215E-04 3.8581E-05 1.3771E-04 1.0349E-05 -8.3276E-04 
Mean Pitch -2.1559E-03 1.0287E-03 -1.9741E-03 -2.4602E-03 -1.3941E-03 4.2695E-04 
Mean Yaw 4.8801E-04 4.2418E-04 4.8039E-04 5.0504E-04 4.7531E-04 4.0965E-04 
SD Roll 2.0405E-01 2.0923E-01 2.0403E-01 2.0480E-01 2.0421E-01 2.0414E-01 
SD Pitch 1.8499E-01 4.3140E-01 1.3447E-01 1.7015E-01 1.2511E-01 1.4475E-01 
SD Yaw 1.5570E-01 1.5713E-01 1.5570E-01 1.5592E-01 1.5569E-01 1.5569E-01 
 
Pitch Sensor -Run4 
Mean Roll -5.9238E-05 1.6375E-03 -9.5945E-04 4.5775E-04 1.1304E-04 2.4406E-04 
Mean Pitch -7.6189E-04 -2.1298E-02 1.4583E-03 -4.6523E-03 -2.3883E-03 -4.6560E-03 
Mean Yaw 4.7618E-04 5.8155E-04 3.9907E-04 5.1042E-04 4.8908E-04 4.9325E-04 
SD Roll 2.0406E-01 2.0408E-01 2.0421E-01 2.0395E-01 2.0402E-01 2.0415E-01 
SD Pitch 1.8536E-01 4.8194E-01 1.3386E-01 1.6545E-01 1.3566E-01 1.3949E-01 
SD Yaw 1.5570E-01 1.5582E-01 1.5569E-01 1.5569E-01 1.5570E-01 1.5570E-01 
Pitch Sensor -Run5 
Mean Roll 6.3375E-05 3.1401E-04 1.1177E-04 -1.0990E-04 1.1554E-04 2.3651E-04 
Mean Pitch -1.8984E-03 -2.8262E-04 -2.5161E-03 -6.0421E-04 5.4420E-05 -2.5429E-03 
Mean Yaw 4.8420E-04 5.2992E-04 4.8680E-04 4.7096E-04 4.8129E-04 4.9450E-04 
SD Roll 2.0406E-01 2.0361E-01 2.0427E-01 2.0438E-01 2.0412E-01 2.0413E-01 
SD Pitch 1.9066E-01 5.0708E-01 1.4116E-01 1.6295E-01 1.3127E-01 1.3886E-01 
SD Yaw 1.5571E-01 1.5576E-01 1.5571E-01 1.5570E-01 1.5569E-01 1.5570E-01 
Table 5-54 Tracking Error (TE) statistics of Pitch Sensor Failures 
 
5.3.4.2. Stick Activity Analysis  
The stick activity for pitch sensor failures is shown in Table 5-55. There is a negligible 
activity along lateral and directional channel for all cases. The hardest failure (SF#2) has 




Table 5-55 Stick Activity for Pitch Sensor Failures 
 
Stick Activity SF #1 SF #2 SF #3 SF #4 SF #5 SF #6 
Longitudinal 0.6278 8.5067 1.2249 0.8744 0.8714 1.0737 
Lateral 0.0000 0.0393 0.0000 0.0000 0.0027 0.0000 
Directional 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 5-56 Average Stick Activity for Pitch Sensor Failures 
5.3.4.3. FDII Analysis of pitch sensor failures 
The pitch sensor failure FDII results are tabulated in Table 5-57 - Table 5-61 . In this case 
as well the results are accurate and there are no cases of wrong detection, isolation and 
identification. 
 
S.No  Failure  Cases Detection Isolation Identification T/F 
1 Pitch  Sensor SFDB 30.34 31.34 31.36 T 
2 Pitch  Sensor LFDB 30.36 31.34 31.36 T 
3 Pitch Sensor SMDB 30.36 31.36 45.28 T 
4 Pitch  Sensor LMDB 30.36 31.36 31.38 T 
5 Pitch  Sensor SSDB 30.36 31.36 40.82 T 
6 Pitch Sensor LSDB 30.36 31.36 52.68 T 
Pitch Sensor -Run1 
Stick Activity SF #1 SF #2 SF #3 SF #4 SF #5 SF #6 
Longitudinal 0.1007 11.2141 0.0029 0.8938 0.9190 0.7252 
Lateral 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Directional 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0019 0.0000 0.0000 
Pitch Sensor -Run2 
Longitudinal 1.1362 4.2131 0.6610 0.5647 0.2493 0.6178 
Lateral 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0305 0.0000 
Directional 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pitch Sensor -Run3 
Longitudinal 0.6846 5.4022 1.0190 0.3033 1.2796 0.7927 
Lateral 0.0000 0.0065 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Directional 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pitch Sensor -Run4 
Longitudinal 1.1865 7.5150 0.9677 0.7743 1.1865 0.8103 
Lateral 0.0000 0.0200 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Directional 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pitch Sensor -Run5 
Longitudinal 1.1865 7.5150 0.9677 0.7743 0.7898 0.8103 
Lateral 0.0000 0.0200 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Directional 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 5-57 FDII results for Pitch Sensor Failure (Run1) 
S.No  Failure  Cases Detection Isolation Identification T/F 
1 Pitch  Sensor SFDB 30.34 31.34 31.36 T 
2 Pitch  Sensor LFDB 30.34 31.34 31.36 T 
3 Pitch Sensor SMDB 30.36 31.36 54.7 T 
4 Pitch  Sensor LMDB 30.36 31.36 31.38 T 
5 Pitch  Sensor SSDB 30.36 31.36 45.26 T 
6 Pitch Sensor LSDB 30.36 31.36 54.2 T 
Table 5-58 FDII results for Pitch Sensor Failure (Run2) 
S.No  Failure  Cases Detection Isolation Identification T/F 
1 Pitch  Sensor SFDB 30.34 31.34 31.36 T 
2 Pitch  Sensor LFDB 30.34 31.34 31.36 T 
3 Pitch Sensor SMDB 30.36 31.36 44.84 T 
4 Pitch  Sensor LMDB 30.34 31.34 31.36 T 
5 Pitch  Sensor SSDB 30.36 31.36 45.12 T 
6 Pitch Sensor LSDB 30.36 31.36 38.64 T 
Table 5-59 FDII results for Pitch Sensor Failure (Run3) 
S.No  Failure  Cases Detection Isolation Identification T/F 
1 Pitch  Sensor SFDB 30.34 31.34 31.36 T 
2 Pitch  Sensor LFDB 30.34 31.34 31.36 T 
3 Pitch Sensor SMDB 30.36 31.36 38.54 T 
4 Pitch  Sensor LMDB 30.36 31.36 31.38 T 
5 Pitch  Sensor SSDB 30.36 31.36 61.14 T 
6 Pitch Sensor LSDB 30.36 31.36 44.96 T 
Table 5-60 FDII results for Pitch Sensor Failure (Run4) 
S.No  Failure  Cases Detection Isolation Identification T/F 
1 Pitch  Sensor SFDB 30.34 31.34 31.36 T 
2 Pitch  Sensor LFDB 30.34 31.34 31.36 T 
3 Pitch Sensor SMDB 30.36 31.36 43.78 T 
4 Pitch  Sensor LMDB 30.36 31.36 31.38 T 
5 Pitch  Sensor SSDB 30.36 31.36 31.38 T 
6 Pitch Sensor LSDB 30.36 31.36 37.82 T 
Table 5-61 FDII results for Pitch Sensor Failure (Run5) 
 
Figure 5-51 shows MQEE for the pitch sensor failure. It can be seen that it is insensitive 
to the failure except the LFDB which is the most severe sensor failure among the six 
cases. OQEE  has correctly detected the pitch sensor failure and is shown in Figure 5-52. 
The areas in the plots are zoomed near the failure time to show the time at which 
detection occurs.  
 101 
 
Figure 5-51- MQEE for Pitch Sensor Failure 
 
Figure 5-52- OQEE for Pitch Sensor failure (Zoomed to show detections) 
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Figure 5-53 Rpq monitored to isolate the sensor failure 
 
Figure 5-53 shows the typical variation of 
pq
R for the pitch sensor failure cases and it can 
be seen that FL bounds are not crossed for nearly 5 sec after the failure is detected. The 
flag for the sensor failure isolation is thus triggered in the FDII warning system 
algorithm. The FDII algorithm switches the logic to sensor failure identification by 
monitoring the DQEE  
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Figure 5-54 Identification of Pitch Sensor failure (SF#1) 
 
Figure 5-55 Identification of Pitch Sensor Failure (SF#2) 
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Figure 5-56 Identification of Pitch Sensor Failure (SF#3) 
 




Figure 5-58 Identification of Pitch Sensor Failure (SF#5) 
 
Figure 5-59 Identification of Pitch Sensor Failure (SF #6)  
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5.3.5. Analysis of Sensor Failure Cases (Yaw Sensor) 
5.3.5.1. Tracking Error Analysis 
 
Yaw Sensor -Run1 
  SF #1 SF #2 SF #3 SF #4 SF #5 SF #6 
Mean Roll -1.6421E-03 -2.1341E-04 -1.4759E-03 -6.7301E-03 -1.4760E-03 1.6956E-03 
Mean Pitch -1.6421E-03 -2.1341E-04 -1.4759E-03 -6.7301E-03 -1.4760E-03 1.6956E-03 
Mean Yaw -1.1979E+00 -2.4136E+00 -9.3007E-01 -1.8499E+00 -6.6375E-01 -1.3262E+00 
SD Roll 1.4298E-01 1.5636E-01 1.4294E-01 1.4547E-01 1.4294E-01 1.4249E-01 
SD Pitch 1.4298E-01 1.5636E-01 1.4294E-01 1.4547E-01 1.4294E-01 1.4249E-01 
SD Yaw 9.4791E-01 1.8981E+00 8.6748E-01 1.7131E+00 6.8316E-01 1.3403E+00 
Yaw Sensor –Run2 
Mean Roll -1.2871E-02 -1.7740E-03 -4.4153E-04 -1.1104E-03 -9.6764E-04 -2.4882E-03 
Mean Pitch -1.2871E-02 -1.7740E-03 -4.4153E-04 -1.1104E-03 -9.6764E-04 -2.4882E-03 
Mean Yaw -1.1732E+00 -2.4010E+00 -9.2860E-01 -1.8535E+00 -6.6318E-01 -1.3348E+00 
SD Roll 1.4767E-01 1.4740E-01 1.4356E-01 1.5010E-01 1.4432E-01 1.4459E-01 
SD Pitch 1.4767E-01 1.4740E-01 1.4356E-01 1.5010E-01 1.4432E-01 1.4459E-01 
SD Yaw 9.5050E-01 1.8604E+00 8.7416E-01 1.7253E+00 6.8619E-01 1.3306E+00 
Yaw Sensor –Run3 
Mean Roll -6.7007E-04 -1.1680E-03 9.5473E-03 4.9286E-04 -1.1467E-03 -1.7731E-03 
Mean Pitch -6.7007E-04 -1.1680E-03 9.5473E-03 4.9286E-04 -1.1467E-03 -1.7731E-03 
Mean Yaw -1.1941E+00 -2.3919E+00 -9.5984E-01 -1.8544E+00 -6.6150E-01 -1.3305E+00 
SD Roll 1.4319E-01 1.4311E-01 1.4949E-01 1.4390E-01 1.4328E-01 1.4296E-01 
SD Pitch 1.4319E-01 1.4311E-01 1.4949E-01 1.4390E-01 1.4328E-01 1.4296E-01 
SD Yaw 9.5086E-01 1.8785E+00 8.6194E-01 1.7177E+00 6.8263E-01 1.3422E+00 
Yaw Sensor –Run4 
Mean Roll -2.3289E-03 -1.9481E-03 -1.3874E-03 -1.1291E-03 -1.8545E-03 -3.9876E-04 
Mean Pitch -2.3289E-03 -1.9481E-03 -1.3874E-03 -1.1291E-03 -1.8545E-03 -3.9876E-04 
Mean Yaw -1.1997E+00 -2.3930E+00 -9.2967E-01 -1.8599E+00 -6.6560E-01 -1.3296E+00 
SD Roll 1.4316E-01 1.4375E-01 1.4314E-01 1.4326E-01 1.4330E-01 1.4343E-01 
SD Pitch 1.4316E-01 1.4375E-01 1.4314E-01 1.4326E-01 1.4330E-01 1.4343E-01 
SD Yaw 9.5006E-01 1.8719E+00 8.6356E-01 1.7151E+00 6.8342E-01 1.3355E+00 
Yaw Sensor –Run 5 
Mean Roll -9.2856E-04 8.3781E-04 -1.3381E-03 -1.0391E-03 -2.8523E-03 -1.8277E-03 
Mean Pitch -9.2856E-04 8.3781E-04 -1.3381E-03 -1.0391E-03 -2.8523E-03 -1.8277E-03 
Mean Yaw -1.1988E+00 -2.3930E+00 -9.2900E-01 -1.8591E+00 -6.6713E-01 -1.3310E+00 
SD Roll 1.4728E-01 1.4388E-01 1.4311E-01 1.4340E-01 1.4318E-01 1.4341E-01 
SD Pitch 1.4728E-01 1.4388E-01 1.4311E-01 1.4340E-01 1.4318E-01 1.4341E-01 
SD Yaw 9.3666E-01 1.8740E+00 8.6482E-01 1.7109E+00 6.9236E-01 1.3381E+00 
Table 5-62 TE statistics for Yaw Sensor Failures 
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5.3.5.2. Stick Activity Analysis 
The pilot activity for the yaw sensor failure cases are shown in Table 5-63 for the 5 runs. 
 
Yaw Sensor -Run1 
Stick Activity SF #1 SF #2 SF #3 SF #4 SF #5 SF #6 
Longitudinal 0.0000 1.8940 0.0000 1.8262 0.0000 2.3537 
Lateral 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Directional 3.0595 24.3675 0.1311 12.8312 0.4138 2.3343 
Yaw Sensor -Run2 
Longitudinal 1.3499 3.1650 0.0000 2.1896 1.3499 0.6082 
Lateral 0.0000 0.0247 0.0000 0.3769 0.0302 0.0000 
Directional 35.0084 14.9832 2.7477 16.3951 12.2264 9.8777 
Yaw Sensor -Run3 
Longitudinal 0.2927 0.0000 1.5230 0.3324 0.2927 0.0000 
Lateral 0.0747 0.1965 0.0221 0.0250 0.4770 0.0000 
Directional 2.4806 2.2408 17.3698 5.3719 1.0700 1.8829 
Yaw Sensor -Run4 
Longitudinal 0.0000 1.2387 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7046 
Lateral 0.0708 0.1148 0.0000 0.0453 0.0000 0.1379 
Directional 3.7617 6.3574 4.9926 2.3088 4.5386 10.5153 
Yaw Sensor -Run5 
Longitudinal 0.6370 0.5484 0.0000 0.5762 0.6370 0.3030 
Lateral 0.0000 0.0000 0.1251 0.0836 0.7332 0.0010 
Directional 8.9623 11.5055 5.4615 5.3606 5.0543 5.5852 
Table 5-63 Stick Activity for Yaw Sensor Failures 
 
The average of the pilot activity for the yaw sensor failure cases is shown in Table 5-64. 
There is a definitive trend of pilot activity higher for a large bias than small bias. 
Consider SF#1(SFDB) and SF#2 (LFDB) which differs only in the bias i.e. 4 deg and 8 
deg. The stick activity along longitudinal, lateral and directional channel is higher for 
SF#2 than SF#1 for a fast drifting bias. Similarly, it is higher for SF#4 than SF#3 for a 
medium drifting bias and higher for SF#6 than SF#5 for a slow drifting bias. This pilot 
activity is mainly because of the time delay in detection between the switching of sensors 






Stick Activity SF #1 SF #2 SF #3 SF #4 SF #5 SF #6 
Longitudinal 0.4559 1.3692 0.3046 0.9849 0.4559 0.7939 
Lateral 0.0291 0.0672 0.0294 0.1062 0.2481 0.0278 
Directional 10.6545 11.8909 6.1405 8.4535 4.6606 6.0391 
Table 5-64 Average Stick Activity for Yaw Sensor Failures 
5.3.5.3. FDII Analysis of Yaw Sensor Failures 
The FDII results for yaw sensor failure cases are shown in Table 5-65 -Table 5-69. The 
FDII scheme has three cases of wrong isolation and identification.  In first run there is a 
wrong identification for SF #6 (LSDB) being wrongly identified as pitch sensor, a wrong 
isolation as actuator in Run2 & Run4 for SF# 3(LFDB) and consequently rudder failure 
identification. This can be attributed to the hard nature of the sensor failure. The dynamic 
signature of a hard yaw sensor is similar to a rudder failure. 
 
S.No  Failure  Cases Detection Isolation Identification T/F 
1 Yaw  Sensor SFDB 31.54 32.54 32.56 T 
2 Yaw  Sensor LFDB 31.38 32.38 32.4 T 
3 Yaw  Sensor SMDB 33.78 34.78 34.8 T 
4 Yaw  Sensor LMDB 31.72 32.72 32.74 T 
5 Yaw  Sensor SSDB 36.62 37.62 37.64 T 
6 Yaw  Sensor LSDB 28.06 29.06 29.8 F(Pitch) 
Table 5-65 FDII results for Yaw Sensor Failure (Run1) 
 
S.No  Failure  Cases Detection Isolation Identification T/F 
1 Yaw  Sensor SFDB 31.46 32.46 32.48 T 
2 Yaw  Sensor LFDB 31.04 31.12 31.14 F(RUDDER) 
3 Yaw  Sensor SMDB 33.14 34.14 34.16 T 
4 Yaw  Sensor LMDB 31.74 32.74 32.76 T 
5 Yaw  Sensor SSDB 31.64 32.64 33.66 T 
6 Yaw  Sensor LSDB 31.96 32.96 32.98 T 
Table 5-66 FDII results for Yaw Sensor Failure (Run2) 
 
S.No  Failure  Cases Detection Isolation Identification T/F 
1 Yaw  Sensor SFDB 31.48 32.48 32.5 T 
2 Yaw  Sensor LFDB 30.72 31.72 31.74 T 
3 Yaw  Sensor SMDB 31.16 32.16 32.18 T 
4 Yaw  Sensor LMDB 31.14 32.14 32.16 T 
5 Yaw  Sensor SSDB 34.74 35.74 35.8 T 
6 Yaw  Sensor LSDB 33.34 34.74 34.76 T 




S.No  Failure  Cases Detection Isolation Identification T/F 
1 Yaw  Sensor SFDB 31.56 32.56 32.58 T 
2 Yaw  Sensor LFDB 30.86 31.46 31.54 F(RUDDER) 
3 Yaw  Sensor SMDB 33.34 34.34 34.42 T 
4 Yaw  Sensor LMDB 31.74 32.74 32.76 T 
5 Yaw  Sensor SSDB 32.6 33.6 33.62 T 
6 Yaw  Sensor LSDB 30.28 31.28 31.62 T 
Table 5-68 FDII results for Yaw Sensor Failure (Run4) 
 
S.No  Failure  Cases Detection Isolation Identification T/F 
1 Yaw  Sensor SFDB 30.22 31.22 31.24 T 
2 Yaw  Sensor LFDB 31.5 32.5 32.52 T 
3 Yaw  Sensor SMDB 30.54 31.54 31.56 T 
4 Yaw  Sensor LMDB 32.98 33.98 34 T 
5 Yaw  Sensor SSDB 34.22 35.72 35.74 T 
6 Yaw  Sensor LSDB 31.18 32.18 32.22 T 
Table 5-69 FDII results for Yaw Sensor Failure (Run5) 
 
 
Figure 5-60 MQEE variation for Yaw Sensor Failure  
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Figure 5-61 OQEE for Detection of Yaw Sensor Failures 
 










 Alarms   
False 





Roll sensor failure 30 30 0 0 0 0 
Pitch Sensor Failure 30 30 0 0 0 0 
Yaw Sensor Failure 30 27 0 0 2 3 
Table 5-70-Summary of Piloted Tests of Sensor Failures with Adaptive FDII scheme 
 
The sensor failures are easily isolated and identified in the piloted experiments. Except 
for the yaw sensor failures all failures are isolated and identified 100% accurately. The 
sensor failures didn’t have any motion cues because of sensor biases. However, the 
instruments in the cockpit reflected this change such as a dipping horizon indicator in 
case of pitch or roll sensor failure. The significant change in instrument reading for the 
tests were for the hardest failure i.e. LFDB (SF#2) which prompted the pilot to correct it. 
In rest of the cases the pilot activity was because of the DNN values not exact as for a 

















Chapter 6. Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.1. Conclusion 
The MOTUS flight simulator has been successfully interfaced with the Simulink schemes 
in this research effort. This is a novel approach to utilize the aural, visual and motion cues 
of a six-DOF simulator for development and testing of control schemes. Based on the 
feedback from the various experienced pilots flying the F-15 models using this interface, 
it can be concluded that the cues are very much realistic and can supersede desktop 
simulations for many advanced studies. There are a few limitations in using the interface 
for carrying out the simulation studies. The unavailability of an F-15 graphical model in 
the X-plane Version 7.61 deemed it necessary to use an F-4 Phantom aircraft graphics for 
the display and visuals. This assumption didn’t affect the flight experiments as the 
necessary instruments were calibrated to reflect the same values as the Simulink model. 
Secondly, the cockpit of the MFS was not used for the experiments due to limited access 
to the simulator MBC. 
 
The NLDI based control schemes together with NN augmentations have demonstrated 
the earlier trends in the simulator and it corroborated the earlier studies on AFDIA and 
SFDIA using the fixed threshold approach. The pilot in the loop experiments provided a 
new dimension to the performance analysis. The results of piloted experiments in the 
MOTUS flight simulator have demonstrated good results for the FDII scheme for the 
multiple runs of the actuator and sensor failures except for a few false FDIIs. The 
adaptive threshold approach to FDII has quick detection of the failure. The scheme was 
found to be robust to small perturbations arising out of pilot activity. The FDII scheme 
had the best performance for sensor failures particularly along roll and pitch channels 
with no cases of false FDII. However, yaw sensor failures induce coupling along all the 
three channels and therefore is more susceptible to false detection. The actuator failures 
FDII is acceptable as it detected and identified the failure correctly for 90% of the test 
cases. Due to the cross-coupling due to pilot activity there were a few cases of false 
detections and isolations.  
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From the TE results of stabilator failure, it can be concluded that EMRAN showed a good 
performance in hard failures. The average pilot workload was lower in case of EMRAN 
augmentation except one time when it was comparable with No NN. The CP remained 
the best indicator of the performance with EMRAN having lower values compared to the 
No NN test cases. There is a reduction with EMRAN along the roll and pitch channels as 
they are the dominant channel on this type of failure. The performance along yaw didn’t 
show any improvement with EMRAN except for hard failures. In summary EMRAN was 
very helpful to the pilot in terms of reduced workload in this stabilator failure along 
dominant channels. The pilot activity was required mainly along roll and pitch channels 
and the CP give an indication that it required lesser pilot activity on behalf of the pilot to 
compensate for the failure and maintain the mission profile. 
 
Similar trends are observed in FDII tests of aileron failures and as before EMRAN 
performance was better along the dominant channel i.e. roll for this failure. Much of the 
activity for compensating this failure was required along roll. There is a significant 
improvement with EMRAN along the roll channel in terms of TE and reduced pilot 
activity. EMRAN had best performance in the dominant channel and shows little or no 
improvement along the cross channel. 
 
The sensor failure cases didn’t have considerable pilot activity because of no motion 
cues. The pilot activity was due to the visuals (change in instrument readings) which the 
pilot tried to compensate. The hard failure (SF#2) had the maximum pilot activity as it 
gave a substantial instrument error and pilot tried compensating it during the interval the 
sensor readings were replaced by MNNs. The CP was of the same order for sensor 
failures in rest of the test cases.  
 
Based on the tests it can be concluded that composite parameter is a good indication of 
the overall system performance with a pilot in loop. It has shown consistent improvement 
with EMRAN NN augmentations in the dominant channels compared to No NN 
augmentation. The EMRAN performance degraded in cross channels for example in yaw 
channel for aileron failures. It can be concluded from the CP values that the NN 
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augmentation was helpful along the dominant channels to the pilot on the onset of failure. 
One reason for this observation can be attributed to the pilot compensation after failure. 
For example in case of stabilator failure the pilot didn’t compensate in yaw channel and 
therefore showed a decrease in EMRAN performance in CP for this channel. In 
conclusion EMRAN was best for dominant channels particular to a failure and didn’t 
show any appreciable performance in cross channels. 
 
This research covered the overview of the simulation environment set up for flight 
control research at WVU. An overview of architecture and functionality of the 
components of the interface of Simulink with MOTUS motion base flight simulator is 
presented. The pilot in the loop experiments on FDII schemes provided an excellent 
example of the software-hardware setup at the WVU in carrying out advanced simulation 
studies for future. It can be concluded that the FDII scheme developed for an integrated 
sensor/actuator failure with adaptive threshold have shown good performance with 
accurate detections with a pilot in the loop. This interface developed at the flight 
simulator extends the simulation capability from desktop to a more realistic environment.   
6.2. Recommendations 
 
This research study had opened a new arena for testing flight control schemes that are 
simulation dependent for development and analysis. The software-hardware interface 
together with a man in the loop has potential application for carrying out a man-machine 
interaction study in the simulator. This application can be extended to carry out studies of 
pilot behavior while carrying out different maneuvers or counteracting different failures. 
Potential application can be in the field of FDII algorithms with fatigue measurements of 
pilot after failure and estimating the effect of pilot reaction to series of failures.  
 
In this study the actuator and sensor failures were induced separately and there 
were no successive failures (actuator after sensor etc) in the same test. Testing the FDII 
schemes with multiple failures is possible extension to this study and would check the 
robustness of the schemes and will allow further improvement to the FDII approach. 
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Also, we have constrained the pilot mission profile to a level flight based on the trim 
settings at a particular flight condition. The throttle is kept constant throughout the flight 
and the pilot didn’t use any throttle control during the course of experiments. As the first 
step to use the flight simulator there are many assumptions like constant throttle, level 
flight and maintaining constant altitude. The NN have been trained for the particular 
flight scenario and a natural extension would be to accommodate changes in flight 
conditions and reconfiguration of NN algorithms based on changing flight envelopes. A 
more complex mission profile should be tested based as there was unavailability of on 
availability of experienced fighter test pilots. More pilot feedback parameters can be 
devised in order to quantify the pilot assessment of the problem in hand while performing 
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